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We model the optimal price setting problem of a firm in the presence of both information and menu
costs. In this problem the firm optimally decides when to collect costly information on the adequacy
of its price, an activity which we refer to as a price "review". Upon each review, the firm chooses whether
to adjust its price, subject to a menu cost, and when to conduct the next price review. This behavior
is consistent with recent survey evidence documenting that firms revise prices infrequently and that
only a few price revisions yield a price adjustment. The goal of the paper is to study how the firm's
choices map into several observable statistics, depending on the level and relative magnitude of the
information vs the menu cost. The observable statistics are: the frequency of price reviews, the frequency
of price adjustments, the size-distribution of price adjustments, and the shape of the hazard rate of
price adjustments. We provide an analytical characterization of the firm decisions and a mapping from
the structural parameters to the observable statistics. We compare these statistics with the ones obtained
for the models with only one type of cost. The predictions of the model can, with suitable data, be
used to quantify the importance of the menu cost vs. the information cost. We also consider a version
of the model where several price adjustment are allowed between observations, a form of price plans
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We study a quadratic tracking problem of an agent subject to two types of adjustment costs.
One is a standard ¯xed cost of adjusting the state, the other is a ¯xed cost of observing
the state. The e®ects of each of these adjustment cost have been thoroughly analyzed in
the literature in a variety of contexts. An example of the ¯xed adjustment cost is the
canonical sS problem. The analysis of the implications of costly observation of the relevant
state is more recent, yet examples abound.1 The model in this paper incorporates both
costs, characterizing the solution of the tracking problem, and studying the implications for
observable statistics on the relevant observation and adjustment decisions.
We develop this model with several applications in mind, ranging from the consumption-
savings, household portfolio choice, to the price-setting problem of a monopolist. Moreover,
the availability of new data sets makes is possible to compare the theory with actual measures
of observations and adjustment frequencies. For concreteness, and because of its importance
in macroeconomics, in this paper we focus on the price setting problem for a ¯rm.2 In this
problem the ¯rm optimally decides when to collect costly information on the adequacy of
its price, an activity which we refer to as a price \review". Upon each review, the ¯rm
chooses whether to adjust its price, subject to a menu cost, and when to conduct the next
price review. The goal of the paper is to study how the ¯rm's choices concerning several
observable statistics depend on the level and relative magnitude of the observation cost vs
the menu cost. Among the observable statistics we focus on are: the frequency of price
reviews, the frequency of price adjustments, the size-distribution of price adjustments, and
the shape of the hazard rate of price adjustments.
Our interest in this question is twofold. First, survey data indicates that ¯rms review the
adequacy of their prices infrequently, and that not all price reviews yield a price adjustment.
Such a pattern cannot be accounted for by existing menu cost models, where price reviews
occur continuously, nor by costly observation models, where each price review is also a price
adjustment. The model with both observation and menu costs naturally accounts for the
observed patterns. Second, menu cost and observation cost models have di®erent implications
for the response to aggregate shocks. For instance models with only observation cost, such as
Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2006, 2007), yield \time-dependent" rules, while models with only
menu cost, as Golosov and Lucas (2007), yield \state-dependent" rules. Our theory makes a
1For examples with a ¯xed observation cost see Caballero (1989), Du±e and Sun (1990), Reis (2006b,a),
Abel et al. (2007, 2009), and more generally the related rational inattention literature as in Moscarini (2004),
Sims (2003).
2Alvarez et al. (2009) analyze a version of the consumption-savings and portfolio choice model studied by
Du±e and Sun (1990) and Abel et al. (2007). That paper uses a novel data set to measure the frequency of
observation and adjustment of portfolios for Italian investors.
1step towards understanding which of these mechanisms is more relevant: with suitable data
the model can be used to quantify the magnitude of the menu vs. the observation cost.
We study a version of the quadratic tracking problem subject to two types of ¯xed cost.
The starting point of the problem is the static cost of a decision maker, simply modeled as
minimizing a quadratic loss function of the di®erence between their choice variable (which we
interpret as the log of the current price) and its bliss point (or target price). We interpret this
function as the cost of having a price at a value di®erent from the one that maximizes current
pro¯ts, i.e. as the negative of the second order expansion on the (log of the) pro¯t function,
where the target is the price that maximizes the static pro¯ts. We let the target value follow
a random walk with drift. We interpret this variation as changes in the marginal cost and
marginal bene¯t of the monopolist, where the drift is the in°ation rate, and the innovations
are idiosyncratic shocks. We refer to the di®erence between the current price and the target
price as the price gap, which we denote by ~ p. Thus the instantaneous loss for a ¯rm is given
by B(~ p(t))2, where B is a parameter that measures the sensitivity of the price gap deviations
in units of the objective function. We assume that the decision maker faces two ¯xed costs to
adjust prices. The ¯rst is a standard menu cost that applies to any change in prices, which
we denote by Ã. The second, which we denote as Á, is an observation cost that the decision
maker must incur to ¯nd the value of the target, or equivalently the value of the price gap.
3 We assume that the decision maker minimizes the expected present value of the quadratic
losses plus the expected discounted sum of the ¯xed costs incurred. We consider two di®erent
technologies for the price changes: the ¯rst one is that an observation cost has to be paid
every time that the price is adjusted, but that the agent can observe without changing the
price (i.e. without paying the menu cost). The second technology allows for price changes
to be done without observing the price gap, a form of indexation to in°ation. We show that
if the drift of the target (i.e. the in°ation rate) is small enough, the decision rules are the
same in both cases, i.e. there is no indexation. In both cases the optimal policy is found by
solving a dynamic programming problem with one state, namely the price gap right after a
price review.
We spend most of the time on the characterization of the optimal decision rules and its
implications for the case without drift, i.e. with zero in°ation. In this case, right after an
observation of the price gap ~ p, the agent chooses whether to pay the menu cost and adjust
the price. Additionally the agent chooses the time until the next observation. We give an
analytical characterization for the solution as we let the discount rate and the ¯xed menu cost
3If the monopolist faces an isoelastic demand curve and a random marginal cost, using a second order log
approximation, the parameter B is a simple function of this elasticity and the ¯xed costs are interpreted as
fraction of a period pro¯t.
2to be small.4 The decision of whether to adjust the price follows an sS rule: price adjustment
are made if the price gap right after an observation is outside the inaction interval (¡¹ p; ¹ p),
and in the case without drift the price gap is set to zero. If the price gap is inside the interval
than there is no price adjustment. The optimal time until the next observation, ¿(~ p), is also a
function of the price gap: its value is longest, equal to ^ ¿, in the range where price adjustment
are optimal. In the inaction interval the function ¿(¢) has an inverted U-shape: it peaks at
a zero price gap, attaining ^ ¿ and is otherwise decreasing in the size of the price gap, namely
¿(~ p) = ^ ¿ ¡ (~ p=¾)2, where ¾ is the standard deviation of the innovations on the idiosyncratic
shock on the target price. This is quite intuitive: for price gaps close but smaller than ¹ p, the
¯rms realizes that it is likely to cross the threshold ¹ p and hence decides to monitor sooner.
To summarize, the optimal decision rules can be expressed as a function of two parameters:
¹ p and ^ ¿. We show that in turn these two parameters can be expressed in essentially closed
form solution as simple functions of three structural parameters: the two normalized cost
Á=B, Ã=B and the innovation variance ¾2. We use this characterization of the decision rules,
as well as the dynamics of the price gap to compute four statistics: the expected number of
price reviews per unit of time, the expected number of price adjustment per unit of time,
the invariant distribution of price changes, and the shape of the hazard rate of price changes.
We ¯nd these statistics interesting because they can be computed using available survey and
scanner micro data sets.
The model we develop embeds the two polar cases of menu cost and observation cost only.
We compare our analytical characterization of the mapping from the structural parameters
to the ¯rm decisions, and to the observable statistics in each of three setups: menu cost only,
observation cost only, and the case with both costs.5 Analyzing the outcomes of the di®erent
setups we show the aspects for which the predictions of the model with two costs are similar
to a \weighted average" of the two polar cases, and the ones where the interaction of the two
cost yields novel predictions for e.g. the size distribution of price adjustments and the shape
of the hazard-rate function.
Next, we describe the form of the decision rules as well as the implied statistics produced
by each model. In the observation cost only case, price reviews and price adjustments coincide
and take place at equally spaced time intervals of length ^ ¿. Thus, the frequency of reviews
and adjustment satis¯es na = nr = 1=^ ¿, which has elasticity 1/2 with respect to B¾2=Á.
Since upon review an adjustment takes place, with no drift the price gap is closed to zero,
and hence price changes are normally distributed with variance ¾2Á=B. In this case the
4We con¯rm the quality of the approximation with extensive numerical analysis.
5Most, but not all, of the analysis in the case of one cost only is in the literature in di®erent papers. We
¯nd it useful to collect the known result and to extend some of them in exactly the same framework so that
the e®ect of the di®erent frictions are easier to compare.
3average change in prices in absolute value, E[j¢pj], has an elasticity 1/4 with respect to
¾2Á=B. Moreover, the instantaneous hazard rate h(t) as a function of the time t between
price changes, is equal to zero until just before t = 1=na at which the review and adjustment
take place, where it jumps to in¯nity. The other extreme case is the one where price reviews
have no cost, but there is a menu cost Ã to change prices. In this case price reviews occur
constantly, i.e. ¿(~ p) = 0, and hence have in¯nite frequency, i.e. nr = 1. The optimal
policy is a standard sS policy, with optimal return point equal to zero, due to the lack of
drift. The threshold of the symmetric range of inaction is given by ¹ p, which has elasticity
1/4 with respect to ¾2Ã=B. By using results from hitting times of a Brownian motion with
two barriers we ¯nd the adjustment frequency na as well as the hazard rate. The average
number of adjustments per unit of time na has elasticity 1/2 with respect to B=(¾2Ã). The
instantaneous hazard rate h(t) starts at zero, is strictly increasing, and it asymptote to a
value with elasticity 1/2 with respect to ¾2Ã=B. In the case with menu cost only the time
between price changes is random but price changes takes two values ¹ p and ¡¹ p, and hence
E[j¢pj] also has elasticity 1/4 with respect to B=(¾2Ã).
The optimal decision rules for the model with two costs combine several of the elements
and elasticities with respect to the structural parameters just described. Recall that with
two costs, ¿(~ p) = ^ ¿ ¡ (~ p=¾)2, in the range of inaction, and otherwise it equals ^ ¿. Thus the
optimal decision rules can be described by two numbers: ^ ¿ and ¹ p. We ¯nd it convenient to
describe them ¯rst ¯xing the ratio of the menu cost to the observation cost, which we denote
as ® = Ã=Á. Fixing ®, the elasticity of ^ ¿ with respect to Á=(¾2B) is 1/2, as in the observation
cost model. Likewise, ¯xing ®, the elasticity of ¹ p with respect to ¾2Ã=B is also 1/2, as in the
menu cost model. On the other hand, increasing ® = Ã=Á increases the threshold ¹ p and the
time until an observation after an adjustment ^ ¿. We ¯nd these results the natural extension
of each of the models with only one cost.
Once we obtain a characterization of the decision rules as a function of the structural
parameters, we move on to analyze the \observable statistics". We study the invariant
distribution of the price gap upon a review for a ¯rm following the optimal decision rules.
Using this distribution we characterize na, the expected number of adjustment per unit of
time, as well as nr, the expected number of reviews per unit of time. We also use this
distribution to analyze the distribution of price changes. We use these statistics to make
several point:
First, the baseline model with two costs naturally accounts for the observation that ¯rms
review their prices more often than they adjust them, since the price reviews where the price
gap falls in the inaction region deliver no price adjustment. The feature that price review
happen more often than price adjustment has been documented by Fabiani et al. (2007) for
4the Euro area.6
Second, the distribution of price changes has no mass between ¡¹ p and ¹ p, and outside
these values it has a density with the same tails as a normal, but with more mass close to
¹ p or ¹ p. For comparison, we recall that the distribution of rpice changes is normal in the
model with observation cost only, and that it is binomial in the case of menu cost only.
Additionally, ¯xing the ratio of the menu to observation cost ® = Ã=Á, the average size of
price changes E[j¢pj] has an elasticity of 1/2 with respect to ¾2B=Á, or alternatively, ¾2B=Ã.
Notice that this is the same elasticity than in the case with only one cost. We ¯nd the shape
of the distribution of price changes interesting because, depending on the size of adjustment
and observation costs, it gives more °exibility to accommodate both relatively large average
size of price changes and relatively small price changes, which seem to be in the data as
displayed by Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008). Indeed Mankiw and Reis (2010) discuss some
of the di±culties of models of price setting under either adjustment or observation costs to
simultaneously account for these facts. However, a positive menu cost Ã > 0 prevents too
small price changes from occurring. This seems consistent with the evidence in Alvarez et al.
(2006) and Cavallo (2009) about the distribution of price changes in di®erent countries.
Third, we identify two ratio of \observable statistics" that provide direct information
about the ratio of the two costs. First we show that nr=na, the ratio between average
frequencies of review and adjustment is a monotonic function that only depends on the
relative size of observation and adjustment costs ® = Ã=Á. This is quite intuitive if one
consider the extreme cases: this ratio is 1 for the observation cost only, and in¯nity for the
menu cost only. In addition, we show that the ratio between the mode and the average of the
size of price changes is a monotone function of the relative size of observation and menu costs
®. This result is also quite intuitive considering the extreme cases, since the distribution is
normal for the observation cost only model, and binomial for the menu cost model. These
results provide two schemes to identify the size of the two costs using statistics that are, at
least in principle, available.
Fourth, we derive the instantaneous hazard rate h(t) of the baseline model with two costs.
This function shares some properties with the observation cost only, like an initial value of
zero for the hazard rate between times t 2 [0; ^ ¿), and a spike (in¯nite) hazard rate at t = ^ ¿.
But unlike this model, it has a ¯nite continuos non-zero hazard rate for higher values of
t. Indeed, loosely speaking, the shape of the hazard rate function has some periodicity, in
that it looks like a series of non-monotone functions around duration that are multiples of
^ ¿. The reason for this monotonicity comes from the fact reviews happens at unequal length
6See also Greenslade and Parker (2008), Blinder et al. (1998) and Alvarez et al. (2006) for survey evidence
about the U.K., U.S. and Canada.
5of time { given by the function ¿(¢) and that adjustment happens depending on whether the
price gap at time of review is larger than the threshold ¹ p at the time of an observation. The
non-monotonicity of the hazard rate is unique to the model with both costs. We ¯nd this
feature appealing because most of the studies fail to ¯nd evidence for increasing hazard rates,
which is the implication for the extreme models with only one cost, as well as for most of the
models in the literature.7
Most of our analysis is in the context of the model with ¼ = 0, i.e. zero in°ation rate.
We brie°y consider the e®ect of in°ation on the rest of the decision rules, ¯rst keeping the
assumption that any price change requires an observations. In this case the optimal return
point will naturally be di®erent form the static optimum, i.e. zero price gap. Indeed once
prices are adjusted the ¯rm will set it to a higher value anticipating the e®ect of in°ation:
right after an adjustment the price gap will be positive and roughly equal to the in°ation rate
¼ times half of expected time until the next adjustment. To understand the forces that the
drift in the target price brings relative to its volatility, we consider the extreme case where we
¯xed ¼ > 0 and let ¾ # 0. In this extreme case, the range of inaction becomes asymmetric, as
well as the function ¿(~ p) which becomes decreasing in the range of inaction, anticipating that
the price gap has a negative drift equal to ¡¼. Through numerical computation, we show
that these features also show up for small in°ation rate, albeit in a tempered form is ¼ is
small. Finally we relax the assumption that every price adjustment requires an observation.
Note that an adjustment without observation is a form of automatic indexation, or what
has been called in the literature, a price path or a price plan. We show that ¯xing a value
of Ã > 0, for positive but su±ciently small in°ation rate all the adjustment will take place
immediately after observation. In words, we show that if in°ation is small relative to the
menu cost, indexation is not optimal.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief survey of the related literature.
Section 3 discusses the recent survey evidence on the ¯rms' decisions concerning the frequency
of price reviews and price adjustments in a number of countries. Section 4 presents our model
of the ¯rm's price setting problem with observation and menu costs. The section characterizes
the ¯rm optimal policy for each of the two the polar cases (menu or observation cost only)
and for the general case. An analytical solution for the ¯rm's optimal decision rule in the
case of zero in°ation is given in Section 5. This rule is used in Section 6 to characterize
analytically the model predictions for the frequency of price reviews, the frequency of price
adjustments, the size-distribution of price adjustments, and the shape of the hazard rate of
7Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) estimate a °at hazard rate on U.S. CPI data, while Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008) estimate a downward sloping hazard using a similar dataset but di®erent methodology. Similar
evidence is documented in the Euro area by Alvarez et al. (2005). Cavallo (2009) estimates an upward
sloping or hump shaped hazard rate for four Latin America countries
6price adjustments. A comparison between the results of our model with those produced by the
polar cases is given. We discuss how these result match against the recent micro evidence on
the distribution of price changes and the shape of the hazard rate of price adjustments. The
results developed so far, under the assumption of zero in°ation, provide a good benchmark
for analyzing cases where in°ation is small. This is shown in Section 7, where the case of high
in°ation is also discussed. Section 7.3 explores the circumstances in which price adjustment
can be made without ¯nding out the information about the state. Proofs and documentation
material is given in the Appendix; a set of Online Appendices provides even more details on
the models discussed in this paper and the ¯ndings in the related literature.
2 Related literature on Optimal Price Setting
A vast body of research has studied the price setting decision by ¯rms.8 In fact, understanding
the way ¯rms set the price of their products is an important issue in the macroeconomic
literature as, among other things, price setting behavior has direct consequences for the
response of an economy to nominal shocks and, therefore, for monetary policy. Despite
the large e®ort, the debate on which model better describes ¯rms' price setting behavior
is still very much open.9 At the centerpiece of this debate is understanding why and how
much product prices are rigid in response to economic shocks, and why prices change rather
infrequently when compared with predictions of standard models under °exible prices.10 Two
types of frictions have been proposed as main causes behind price rigidity, namely adjustment
costs and observation costs.11
The key element of the model of price setting under adjustment cost is the state depen-
dence of individual decisions: the agent acts when the state crosses some critical threshold,
balancing cost and bene¯ts of adjustment. Within this literature, Dixit (1991) has studied
the problem of a ¯rm that faces a state given by a random walk process. Dixit (1991)' s
results provide a natural framework to analyze the properties of this class of models with
respect to price setting decisions in presence of adjustment costs.12 In fact, our model nests
Dixit (1991) in the special case of no observation cost. Similarly to our model, the model with
adjustment cost only implies that the ¯rm adjusts its price only infrequently. In particular,
8For a review of the literature see, for instance, Golosov and Lucas (2007), Klenow and Malin (2010),
Mankiw and Reis (2010) and references therein.
9See, for instance, Klenow and Malin (2010) and Mackowiak and Smets (2008).
10See Christiano et al. (1998), Boivin et al. (2009) and Mackowiak et al. (2009) for empirical evidence.
11See Sheshinski and Weiss (1977, 1979, 1983), Barro (1972) and Dixit (1991) for a review of early results
on price setting behavior under costly price adjustments;
12There is a large literature studying consequences for aggregate dynamics of price adjustment costs. See
Dotsey et al. (1999), Golosov and Lucas (2007) and Midrigan (2007) for a review.
7the frequency of price adjustment decreases in the size of the adjustment threshold, while
increases in the volatility of the state. However, from the perspective of models of price
adjustment under 'menu' cost, our paper contributes to the existing literature on several
important dimensions.
First, not surprisingly, the model with both types of costs is able to generate infrequent
price adjustments as well as infrequent price reviews, with the latter taking place more often
than the former.13 Second, quite interestingly, our model naturally generates moments of
the distribution of price changes as well as the shape of the instantaneous hazard rate of
price adjustments that are consistent with existing micro studies.14 These results are quite
remarkable if one compares to models of price setting under adjustment cost only. In fact,
in these models dispersion in the size of price changes is typically 'built-in' by assuming
that the price setter faces time-varying adjustment costs, as in Dotsey et al. (1999), or that
multi-product ¯rms face economies of scope in adjusting prices of di®erent products, as in
Midrigan (2007). In our model, these results arise naturally as a consequence of the ¯rms
facing both observation and adjustment costs. In addition, our model with both costs implies
a shape for the hazard rate of price changes that resembles the downward sloping hazard rate
estimated by Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) and Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008). In contrast,
the 'menu cost' model implies an upward sloping hazard rate. Some authors have appealed to
heterogeneity in adjustment costs across di®erent products to reconcile 'menu cost' models
with the estimated downward sloping hazard rate. However, while Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2008) ¯nd empirical support for this hypothesis, Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) show that,
even after controlling for product heterogeneity, the hazard rate is still downward sloping.
Our model provides an alternative explanation of the downward sloping hazard rate which
does not rely on product heterogeneity.
On the other side, our model directly compares to the existing literature studying price
setting decisions under imperfect information. This literature dates back to the seminal work
by Phelps (1969) and Lucas (1972). In these models, the speed with which prices respond to
changes in the state relates to the speed with which information about this shock is embedded
in the price setting decision. This literature has recently been revisited by several authors
looking for alternative models of price setting in order to account for the sluggish response
13See Section 3 for survey evidence about the relationship between frequency of price adjustment and
review.
14Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) document that price changes are usually big in absolute terms (averaging
around 10 percent), although a large subset are much smaller (5 percent or less). There is disagreement on the
shape of the hazard rate. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) favors a downward sloping shape, while Klenow
and Kryvtsov (2008) sustain that the hazard rate is °at after controlling for products heterogeneity. See
Alvarez et al. (2006) for equivalent evidence on the Euro area, and Cavallo (2009) for evidence on developing
countries.
8of prices to nominal shocks. In particular, Reis (2006b) and Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2006,
2007) generalize Caballero (1989) and model imperfect information as arising from a ¯xed
cost of observing the state.15 In these models, the ¯rm reviews the state infrequently and,
due to the absence of any adjustment cost, adjust prices anytime the state is reviewed. There
is no arrival of new information in between times of reviews. Reis (2006b) shows that, in
standard frameworks, the optimal rule is to review and, contemporaneously, adjust prices at
a constant frequency. By including both observation and adjustment costs, our model con-
tributes to this literature on several dimensions. First, consistently with the survey evidence,
our model implies that not all price reviews yield an adjustment. Second, our model implies
distribution and hazard rate of price adjustments that are more consistent with existing em-
pirical evidence. In particular, our model avoids in¯nitesimally small price adjustments from
occurring, and allows for richer shapes of the hazard rate of price adjustments than the model
with observation cost only.16 Third, in our model the optimal time between reviews is state
dependent. In addition, while in the framework considered by Reis (2006b) ¯rms can choose
a pricing plan at each observation date and freely adjust prices at any moment between ob-
servation dates, in our model due to the adjustment cost this strategy is not optimal unless
the in°ation rate is relatively large. In fact, we show that if in°ation is small relatively to
the adjustment cost price adjustments only take place immediately after an observation. On
this dimension, our results also di®er from Burstein (2006) which studies the case where the
¯rm reviews its state continuously, but can specify an entire sequence of future prices upon
payment of a ¯xed cost. In fact, di®erently from Burstein (2006) we not only assume that
the ¯rm has to pay a ¯xed cost to review the state, but also that the ¯rm faces a ¯xed cost
of adjustment anytime it changes its price.
Finally, there is a recent literature that studies price setting decisions, and their aggregate
consequences, within models that incorporates both some combination of imperfect informa-
tion and sticky prices.17 However, in most of these studies either the frequency of price
adjustment or review is exogenously given. By endogenizing both decisions of reviewing the
information and adjusting the price, our model allows to capture the interaction and existing
complementarity between these two frictions. The closest framework to the one of our paper
15Woodford (2001) and Makowiak and Wiederholt (2009) model information °ows as depending on a signal
about the underlying state which realizes every period. In these models, what prevents the ¯rm from perfectly
observing the state in every period is limited information processing capabilities, as originally proposed by
Sims (2003). Given that in these models new, although partial, information arrives every period, the ¯rm
changes its price continuously. See Matejka (2009) for generalizations of this framework to obtain infrequent
adjustments.
16See Section 5 for more details.
17See, for instance, Nimark (2008), Morris and Shin (2006), Woodford (2008), Angeletos and La'O (2009),
Gertler and Leahy (2008) and Bonomo and Carvalho (2004). See Mankiw and Reis (2010) for a review.
9is the discussion of the work by Woodford (2008) done by Burstein.18. Similarly to this paper,
Gorodnichenko (2008) studies a model where each ¯rm has to pay a ¯xed cost to acquire
information and a ¯xed cost to change the price. Di®erently from this paper, Gorodnichenko
(2008) studies the price setting problem within a general equilibrium framework where ¯rms
observe the past realization of the aggregate price level at no cost. While this more general
framework allows to address some important questions such as the response of in°ation and
output to nominal shocks, it implies that the average frequency of price adjustment is larger
than the average frequency of information acquisition. The latter is at odds with survey
evidence by Fabiani et al. (2006). Moreover, the simple framework of this paper allows for a
quasi-analytical solution of the model which fully characterizes the mapping from observable
statistics to the costs of acquiring information and adjusting the price. More generally, our
model with both observation and adjustment costs contributes to the existing literature by
providing a natural framework within which evaluating and quantifying the impact of each
type of cost on the price setting decision.
3 Evidence on Price Adjustments vs. Price Reviews
Several recent studies measure two distinct dimensions of the ¯rm's price management: the
frequency of price reviews, or the decision of assessing the appropriateness of the price cur-
rently charged, and the frequency of price changes, i.e. the decision to adjust the price. The
typical survey question asks ¯rms: \In general, how often do you review the price of your
main product (without necessarily changing it)?"; with possible choices yearly, semi-yearly,
quarterly, monthly, weekly and daily. The same surveys contain questions on frequency of
price changes too. Fabiani et al. (2007) survey evidence on frequencies of reviews and ad-
justments for di®erent countries in the Euro area, and Blinder et al. (1998), Amirault et al.
(2006), and Greenslade and Parker (2008) present similar evidence for US, Canada and UK.
This section uses this survey data to document that the frequency of price reviews is larger
than the frequency of price changes. We believe that the level of both frequencies, especially
the one for reviews, are measured very imprecisely. Yet, importantly for the theory presented
in this paper, we have found that in all countries, and in almost all industries in each coun-
try, and for almost all the ¯rms in several countries, the frequency of review is consistently
higher than the frequency of adjustment. We will argue that, given our understanding of the
precision of the di®erent surveys, the most accurate measures of the ratio of price reviews to
price adjustments per year are between 1 and 2. In the rest of this section we document this
fact, referring the interested reader to the Online Appendix D for more documentation.
18This is apparently based in work in preparation by Burnstein,Hellwig and Venki
10Table 1: Price-reviews and price-changes per year
AT BE FR GE IT NL PT SP EURO CAN UK US
Medians
Review 4 1 4 3 1 4 2 1 2.7 12 4 2
Change 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 2 1.4
Mass of ¯rms (%) with at least 4 reviews/changes
Review 54 12 53 47 43 56 28 14 43 78 52 40
Change 11 8 9 21 11 11 12 14 14 44 35 15
Number of changes and reviews per year. The sources for the medians are Fabiani et al. (2007) 2003
Euro area survey, Amirault et al. (2006) 2003 Canadian survey, Greenslade and Parker (2008) 2008 UK
survey. See the Online Appendix D for a discussion of the sources and the measurement issues involved.
The upper panel of Table 1 reports the median frequency of price reviews and the median
frequency of price adjustments across all ¯rms in surveys taken from various countries. The
median ¯rm in the Euro area reviews its price a bit less than three times a year, but changes
its price only about once a year, and similar for UK and US. 19
These surveys collect a wealth of information on many dimensions of price setting, well
beyond the ones studied in this paper. Yet, for the questions that we are interested in, the
survey data from several countries have some drawbacks. We think that, mostly due to the
design of these surveys, the level of the frequencies of price review and price adjustments
are likely subject to a large amount of measurement error. One reason is that in most of
the surveys ¯rms were given the following choices for the frequency of price reviews: yearly,
quarterly, monthly and weekly (in some also semi-yearly and less than a year). It turns out
that these bins are too coarse for a precise measurement, given where the medians of the
responses are. For example, consider the case where in the population the median number
of price reviews is exactly one per year, but where the median number of price changes is
strictly larger than one per year. Then, in a small sample, the median for reviews will be
likely 1 or 2 reviews a year, with similar likelihood. Instead the sample median for number of
adjustments per year is likely to be one. From this example we remark that the median for
price reviews is imprecisely measured, as its estimates °uctuates between two values that are
one hundred percent apart. The con¯guration described in this example is likely to describe
several of the countries in our surveys.20 Another reason is that in some cases the sample
19This evidence about the frequency of price adjustment is roughly consistent with previous studies at the
retail level. See Alvarez et al. (2006) for more details.
20For example in Portugal the median frequency of review is 2, but the fraction that reviews at one year
or less is 47%, while for price adjustment the median is one and the fraction of ¯rms adjusting exactly once
a year is 49.5%, see Martins (2005). In the UK for 1995 the median price review is 12 times a year, but the
fraction that reviews at most 4 times a years is about 46%, while for price adjustment the median is 2 and
11size is small. While most surveys are above one thousand ¯rms, the surveys for Italy has less
than 300 ¯rms and the one for the US has about 200 ¯rms. Yet another di±culty with these
measures is that several surveys use di®erent bins to classify the frequency of price reviews
and that one price changes. For instance in France and Italy ¯rms are asked the average
number of changes, instead of being given a set of bins, as is the case for the frequency of
reviews.21
The bottom panel of Table 1 reports another statistic that is informative on the relative
frequency of reviews and adjustments: the fraction of ¯rms reviewing and changing respec-
tively their price at least four times a year. We see this statistic as informative, and less
subject to measurement error, because this frequency bin appears in the questionnaire for
both the review and the adjustment decision for almost all countries. It shows that the
mass of ¯rms reviewing prices at least four times a year is substantially larger than the
corresponding one for price changes.
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Note: data for each dot are the mean number of price changes and reviews in industry
j in country i.
the fraction of ¯rms adjusting 2 times or less a year is 66%, see Hall et al. (2000). Indeed, consistent with
our hypothesis of measurement error, in a similar survey for the UK for year 2007-2008, the median price
review is 4 and the median price adjustment is 4, see Greenslade and Parker (2008).
21Furthermore for Germany ¯rms where asked whether or not they adjusted the price in each of the
preceding 12 months; this places an upper bound of 12 on the frequency of adjustments, while no such
restriction applies to the number of reviews.
12Figure 1 plots the average number of price reviews against the average number of price
adjustments across a number of industries in six countries. This ¯gure shows that in the six
countries the vast majority of the industry observations lies above the 45 degree line, where
the two frequencies coincide. Most of the industries for Belgium, Spain and the UK have a
ratio of number of reviews per adjustment between 1 and 2 (i.e. lies between the two lower
straight lines). The data for France, Italy and Germany has much higher dispersion in this
ratio. We believe that the reason of the higher dispersion for Italy, Germany and France
is due to the measurement error discussed above. Our belief is based on the fact that the
questionnaire in the surveys for Belgium and Spain treat price reviews and price changes
symmetrically and they record the average frequencies as an integer as opposed to a coarse
bin.
For four countries Table 2 classi¯es the answers of each ¯rm on three mutually exclusive
categories: 1) those that change their prices more frequently than they review them, 2) those
that change and review their prices at the same frequency, 3) and those that change their
prices less frequently than they adjust them. Table 2 shows that most of the ¯rms respond
that they review their prices at frequencies greater or equal than the one in which change
their prices. We conjecture that the percentage of ¯rms in catergory 1, i.e. those changing
the price more frequently than reviewing it, is actually even smaller than what is displayed
in the table due to measurement error.
Table 2: Frequency of Price Changes and Reviews at Firm Level
Belgium France Germany Italy Spain¤
Percentage of Firms with:
1) Change > Review 3 5 19 16 0
2) Change = Review 80 38 11 38 89
3) Change < Review 17 57 70 46 11
N of Observations (¯rms) 890 1126 835 141 194
¤ For Spain is only for ¯rms that review four or more times a year. Sources: Table 17 in Aucremanne
and Druant (2005) for Belgium, and our calculations based on the individual data described in
Loupias and Ricart (2004), Stahl (2005), and Fabiani et al. (2004) for France, Germany, and Italy.
For Spain from section 4.4 of Alvarez and Hernando (2005). See Online Appendix D for details.
4 A price setting problem
We consider a decision maker who faces a period return function given by ¡B (p(t) ¡ p¤ (t))
2
where p(t) is a decision for the agent and p¤(t) is random target, i.e. the optimal value that
13she will set with full knowledge of the state of the problem. The target changes stochastically,
and we assume that the agent must pay a ¯xed cost Á to observe the state p¤(t), and that
she maximizes expected discounted values. The constant B measures of the strength of the
cost of the deviations from the target relative to Á. Moreover, it is assumed that the agent
faces a physical cost Ã associated with resetting the price (a \menu cost").
The target price p¤(t) follows a random walk with drift ¼, with normal innovations with
variance ¾2 per unit of time, or
p
¤(T + t) = p
¤(T) + ¼ t + s ¾
p
t ; (1)
where s is a standard normal, so that ET [ p¤(T + t) ] = p¤(T)+¼ t, V arT [ p¤(T + t) ] = ¾2 t,
and ET (p(T) ¡ p¤(T + t))
2 = (p(T) ¡ p¤ (T) ¡ ¼t)
2 + t ¾2 . In the case where the ¯rm sets
the price level p(T) in nominal terms, the drift ¼ can be interpreted as the in°ation rate,
since p¤(t) denotes a real variable.22
We index the times at which the agent chooses to pay the cost Á and observe the state
by Ti, with 0 = T0 < T1 < T2 < ¢¢¢. After observing the value of the state at a date t = T,
the agent decides whether to pay the cost Ã and adjust the value of its control variable p(t)
that will apply for the times t 2 (Ti;Ti+1).
Appendix A discusses two simple cases that are useful to interpret the coe±cient of the
quadratic period cost of the tracking problem described above. In one case it is the second
order term of the pro¯t for a linear demand model, and in the other is the second-order term
from a log approximation of the pro¯t function. In these cases p(t) is either the price or the
log-price of a monopolistic ¯rm, and p¤(t) its corresponding static optimal level. In the linear
demand case the changes in p¤(t) are due to both shifts in the demand intercept a and changes
in the marginal cost c. In the log-approximation of the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolist problem
with constant demand elasticity ´ > 1, they are due to changes in the (log of the) marginal
cost c. The parameter B in the °ow return is given by half of the second derivative of the
pro¯t function, so it is given by B = b the absolute value of slope of the linear demand, and
by B = 1
2 ´ (´¡1), in the Dixit-Stiglitz case. In the linear case the ¯xed cost Á is an additive
term to the objective function. In the Dixit-Stiglitz the interpretation for the costs Á and Ã
is that they are measured as a proportion of pro¯ts per unit of time.23 The simpli¯cation of
using a quadratic approximation to the pro¯t function has been used in the seminal work on
price setting problem with menu cost by Caplin and Spulber (1987) and Caplin and Leahy
22 Another interpretation is that ¼ describes a drift in the target p¤(t) due to, say, a trend in productivity
or a product life-cycle.
23Simple algebra shows that in the Dixit-Stiglitz example revenues are ´ times pro¯ts, a relationship that
is useful to interpret the magnitude of the cost.
14(1991, 1997), as discussed by Stokey (2008), and also by Caballero (1989) and Moscarini
(2004) in the context of costly observation models.
We make two comments about our assumption about the `technology' to change prices.
First, for most of the paper we impose that at the time of an adjustment the agent must also
observe, i.e. it must pay the observation cost. Most of the paper treats the case where the
target price p¤(t) has no drift, i.e. the no in°ation case, in which even if agents could adjust
without observing they will not do so. Instead if the drift is large enough relative to the
volatility, it will be optimal to sometimes adjust without observing. We discuss this issue in
Section 7.3. Second, we assume that, after paying the adjustment cost, ¯rms set a price that
stays ¯xed until the next adjustment. In Section 4.1 we brie°y comment on the possibility
that the ¯rm sets a path for the prices rather than a value.
For a better understanding the nature of the problem with both observation and menu
costs, and to relate to the literature, the next two subsection discuss the polar cases in which
there is an observation cost only (Á > 0, Ã = 0) and a menu cost only (Á = 0, Ã > 0). We
then discuss the problem in the presence of both costs.
4.1 Price Setting with observation cost





















where, without loss of generality, we are starting at time t = 0 being an observation date, so
that T0 = 0.





B (p(Ti) ¡ p¤(t))
2¤
dt is the integral of the present value of
the expected pro¯ts after observing the state at time Ti and setting the price to p(Ti) to
be maintained from time Ti until the new observation date Ti+1. The conditioning set is all
the information available up to Ti. The expectation outside the sum of the maximization
problem conditions on the information available at time zero. The notation of this problem
assumes that a price adjustment can only happen at the time of a price review. This is the
assumption we employ in most of the paper, except for Section 7.3 were we relax it.
Given two arbitrary Ti and Ti+1, de¯ne:
^ p ´ p(Ti) ¡ p













15Two comments are in order. First, after observing the value of p¤(Ti), the ¯rm optimal
pricing decision ^ p concerns the new price in excess of p¤(Ti) measured in units of the drift ¼.
Second, instead of setting a constant price we might consider letting the ¯rm set a path for
p(t) for t 2 [Ti ; Ti+1). It is clear from the objective function that the ¯rm would then choose
p(t) = p¤(Ti)+¼t, and hence the minimized objective function would be identically zero, i.e.
v(Ti+1¡Ti) = 0. Mechanically, this has the same e®ect on the solution of the problem in this
section of setting the drift of the state to zero, i.e. setting the in°ation rate to ¼ = 0. Thus
we can interpret the model with ¼ = 0 as a problem in which the ¯rm is allowed to set a path
for p(t). Alternatively, we can also consider the problem where the cost Á applies for a price
review, where the ¯rm ¯nds out the value of p¤(t), but that it has no cost of changing prices
without gathering any new information. In this case the optimal policy is also to change the
prices between reviews at the rate ¼ per unit of time. Hence, in either of these alternative
scenarios the solution of the ¯rm's problem is equivalent to the one we present in this section,
but setting the drift of prices to zero, i.e. ¼ = 0. We will revisit this issue in Section 7.3, but
we return to the assumption that prices can only be changed in a review.
The ¯rst order condition with respect to ^ p of the function v(¿), de¯ned in equation (3),







1 ¡ e¡½¿ !
¿
2
as ½ # 0;










Á + B ¼








Comparing equation (2) with equation (4) we notice that in the second expression we have
solved for the expected values, and we have also subsumed the choice of the price into the
function v. We can write this problem in a recursive way by letting ¿ ´ Ti+1 ¡ Ti be the




Á + B ¼









where we use the result that the history of the shocks up to that time is irrelevant for the
optimal choice of ¿, given our assumptions on p¤(t). The optimal time between observations
(and adjustments) solves:
V = B ¾
2 min
¿
~ Á + v(¿) ¼2
¾2 +
R ¿
0 e¡½t t dt
1 ¡ e¡½¿ ; where ~ Á ´
Á
B ¾2 ; (5)
16a problem de¯ned by three parameters: ~ Á, (¼=¾)2 and ½.
Using this setup, the next proposition provides an analytical characterization of the op-
timal length of the inaction period for the case of small discounting (½ ! 0) and for the case
without drift (¼ = 0). Both cases provide very accurate approximation of the solution with
non-zero drift and discounting provided these are small, as is likely the case in our data.
Proposition 1. The optimal decision rule ¿¤ for the time between observations when
½ ! 0 is a function of two arguments, ¿¤
³
Á
B ¾2 ; ¼2
¾2
´
, with the following properties:
1. ¿¤ is increasing in the normalized cost Á=(B¾2), decreasing in the normalized drift ¼=¾,
and decreasing in the innovation variance ¾2
2. The elasticity of ¿¤ with respect to Á=(B¾2) is:
1/2 as Á=B ! 0, or ¼ = 0;
1/3 for ¾ = 0.
3. For ¼ = 0 and ½ > 0, then ¿¤ solves ~ Á = 1
2¿2 ¡ 1
6½¿3 +o(½2¿3) ; so that ¿¤ is increasing




4. The derivative of ¿¤ with respect to ¼ is zero at zero in°ation if ¾ > 0.
The proposition shows that for small values of the (normalized) observation cost ~ Á the
square root formula gives a good approximation, so that second order costs of observation
gathering give rise to ¯rst order spells of inattention. Two special cases are worth mentioning.
First the case with zero drift, i.e. ¼ = 0, which gives a square root formula on the cost ~ Á and
with elasticity ¡1 on ¾. As we discussed above, the ¼ = 0 case can be interpreted as a setting
where the ¯rm is allowed to set a path for its price. The other special case of interest is when
there is no uncertainty, i.e. ¾ = 0. We can think of this as a limiting case of the observation
problem. When the uncertainty is tiny, the rule becomes even more inertial, switching from
a square to a cubic root. Alternatively, this can be reinterpreted as a deterministic model
with a physical menu cost of price setting (equal to Á), where the ¯rm's price drifts away
from the optimal level due to the in°ation trend.
For future reference we notice that in the case of no drift (¼ = 0), and when we let
½ # 0, we have that the time between observations/adjustments ¿¤, its reciprocal, the number
of observations/adjustments per unit of time n, and the average size of price adjustments

















h(t) = 0 for t 2 [0;¿
¤]; and h(¿
¤) = 1 :
where h(t) is the instantaneous hazard rate of a price adjustment as a function of t, the time
elapsed since the last price change.
While the nature of our approximation is di®erent, several of the conclusions of this
proposition con¯rm previous ¯ndings in Reis (2006b). In particular, in his Proposition 4 the
approximate optimal solution for the inaction interval follows a square root formula, just like
we obtain under point 2. Also, as in his Proposition 5, the length of the inaction intervals
is decreasing in the variance of the innovations, and increasing in the (normalized) cost of
adjustment, as we ¯nd under point 1. Finally in this setup the length of the inaction spells
is constant, as in the special case that Reis discusses in his Proposition 5. In both our and
his model the reason behind this result is that the state follows a brownian motion and that
the level of the value function upon adjustment is independent of the state.24
4.2 Price Setting with menu cost
In this section we assume the ¯rm observes the state p¤ without cost, i.e. Á = 0, but that it
must pay a ¯xed cost Ã to adjust prices. This is the standard menu cost model. The ¯rm
observes the underlying target value p¤(t) continuously but acts only when the current price,
p(t), is su±ciently di®erent from it, i.e. when the deviation ~ p(t) ´ p(t)¡p¤(t), is su±ciently
large. Thus optimal policy is characterized by a range of inaction. Using ^ p ´ p(Ti) ¡ p¤(Ti)
to denote the optimal reset price at the time of adjustment, and using the law of motion for
p¤ in equation (1), the evolution of the price deviation is ~ p = ^ p ¡ ¼ t ¡ s¾
p
t.
The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in the range of inaction ~ p 2 [p ; ¹ p] is:
½V (~ p) = B ~ p
2 ¡ V






The optimal return point is:
^ p = arg min
~ p
V (~ p) =) V
0(^ p) = 0 ; (8)
24In the sense that the state only a®ects the value function level but not its shape, so that the optimal
choice of the inaction interval does not depend on it.
18and the boundary conditions are given by
V (¹ p) = V (^ p) + Ã and V
0(¹ p) = 0 ; (9)
V (p) = V (^ p) + Ã and V
0(p) = 0 : (10)
While the standard way to solve this problem is to use the close form solution of the ODE and
use the boundary conditions to obtain an implicit equation for ¹ p, we pursue an alternative
strategy that will be useful to compare with the solution for the problem with both cost.
Since for ¼ = 0 the value function is symmetric and attains a minimum at ~ p = 0, we use the
following fourth order approximation to V (¢) around zero:










4 for all ~ p 2 [¡¹ p ; ¹ p]; (11)
where the symmetry arond zero implies V 0(0) = V 000(0) = 0. Note that the boundary
conditions equation (8), equation (9), and equation (10), imply that V (¢) is convex around
~ p = 0 but concave around ¡¹ p and ¹ p. Thus a forth order approximation is the smaller order
that we can use to capture this, with V 00(0) > 0 and V 0000(0) < 0. The approximation will be
accurate for small values of Ã, since in this case the range of inaction is small.
Proposition 2. Given ¼ = 0, the width of the range of inaction, 2 ¹ p, for small Ã¾2=B







The result for the quartic root is essentially the one in Dixit (1991), who obtained it through
a di®erent argument. The approximation of equation (12) is very accurate for a large range
of values of the cost Ã.
In this case price adjustments take two values only, and hence the average size of price
changes is E[ j¢pj ] = ¹ p. Instead, the number of adjustments per unit of time is more involved,
but it can be computed using the function de¯ning the expected time until adjustment,
Ta(~ p), i.e. the expected value of the time until ~ p ¯rst reaches ¹ p or p. The average number of
adjustments, denoted by n, is then 1=Ta(^ p). The function Ta(~ p) satis¯es the o.d.e.:







a (~ p) and Ta(p) = Ta(¹ p) = 0 : (13)
For the case of ¼ = 0 the solution is Ta(~ p) =
¹ p2¡~ p2
¾2 . Hence the average number of adjustments
19per unit of time n satis¯es n ´ 1
Ta(0) = ¾2
¹ p2. Indeed, the distribution of the ¯rst times between
subsequent price adjustment is known in closed form, and hence one can use it to characterized
h(t), the instantaneous hazard rate of a price change as a function of t the time elapsed since













and h(0) = 0 ;
h













where we use the approximation for ¹ p.
4.3 Price Setting with observation and menu costs
In this section we consider the problem where the decision maker faces two costs: an obser-
vation cost Á that is paid to observe the state p¤(t), and a ¯xed cost Ã that is paid to change
the price. We ¯rst write the corresponding sequence problem:































where, as in Section 4.1, the sequence fTig denotes the stopping times for the observation of
the state p¤(t), and where ÂTi is an indicator that the agent will pay the menu cost Ã and
adjust the price to p(Ti) so that prices evolve according to:
p(t) = p(Ti¡1) for t 2 [Ti;Ti+1) if ÂTi = 0 ; (15)
p(t) = p(Ti) for t 2 [Ti;Ti+1) if ÂTi = 1 :
where, without loss of generality, we are starting at time t = 0 being an observation date,
so that T0 = 0. As in the problem of Section 4.1, the notation ETi(¢) denotes expectations
conditional on the history of fp¤(s)g up to t = Ti . The process for fp¤(t)g follows a random
walk with drift as in equation (1), so the current value of the process is a su±cient statistics
for the distribution of its future realizations. Finally notice that the objective function is
homogeneous of degree one in (B;Á;Ã). Thus the optimal policy will be a function only of the
20parameters (½;¼;Á=B;Ã=B;¾2), so that we can normalize B = 1 without loss of generality
where we ¯nd it convenient.
Following the same steps as in Section 4.1, we write the Bellman equation for the ¯rm's
problem excluding all the terms that the ¯rm cannot a®ect and in terms of the deviations
~ p(T + t) ´ p(T) ¡ p¤(T + t) = ^ p(T) ¡ ¼ t ¡ s¾
p
t. We measure the value function just after
paying the observation cost and observing the state ~ p:
V (~ p) = min
n
¹ V (~ p) ; ^ V
o
; (16)
where ¹ V (~ p) is the value function if the ¯rm knows the state, but does not change the price,
and ^ V is the value function if the ¯rm decides to set the optimal price ^ p. Thus























where N(¢) is the CDF of a standard normal.25 The value function conditional on the ¯rm
not changing the price is:























The next proposition states that the operator de¯ned by the right side of equation (16),
equation (17) and equation (18) is a contraction in the space of bounded and continuous
functions. We will use this for further characterizations. The argument is intuitive but non-
standard, since the length of the time period is a decision variable, potentially making the
problem a continuous time one. Since we assume that Á > 0 revisions should be optimally
spread out. We then have:
Proposition 3. The value function is uniformly bounded and continuos on ~ p. If Á > 0
then the optimal time between observations is uniformly bounded by ¿ > 0, and thus the
operator de¯ned by the right side of equation (16), equation (17) and equation (18) is a
contraction of modulus exp(¡½¿).
We conjecture that the form of the optimal decision rule is that there will be two thresholds








dN(s) = (p ¡ ¼t)
2 + ¾2t.
21for ~ p that will de¯ne a range of inaction, [p; ¹ p]. These threshold are such that
¹ V (~ p) < ^ V if ~ p 2 (p ; ¹ p) and that ¹ V (~ p) > ^ V if ~ p < p or ~ p > ¹ p :
If upon paying the observation cost the ¯rm discovers that the state ~ p is in the range of
inaction, then the ¯rm will decide not to pay the cost Ã and not to adjust the price; moreover
the ¯rm will decide to take a look again at time ¿(~ p). If otherwise, the state is outside the
range of inaction, the ¯rm will pay the cost Ã, set the optimal price, and also set the new
interval at which to observe the state ^ ¿.
5 Optimal Decision rules for the case with no-drift
In this section we study the case where p¤ has no drift (¼ = 0) which simpli¯es the problem.
We show that the value function is symmetric around zero, with a minimum at ~ p = 0. The
optimal choice of p upon paying the cost Ã is ^ p = 0, ¿(0) = ^ ¿, and ¿(~ p) symmetric around
zero. Moreover, ¿(¢) has a maximum at ~ p = 0, and has an inverted U-shape. The thresholds
for the range of inaction satisfy: p = ¡¹ p.
We begin by showing that V (¢) is symmetric around ~ p = 0 and increasing around it. The
Bellman equations for ~ p 2 (¡1;1) are:












































V (~ p) = minf^ V ; ¹ V (~ p)g (21)
Proposition 4. Let ¼ = 0. The value function V is symmetric around ~ p = 0, and V is
strictly increasing in ~ p for 0 < ~ p < ¹ p. The optimal price level conditional on adjustment is
^ p = 0. The derivative of ¹ V (~ p) for 0 · ~ p is given by
0 · ¹ V
0(~ p) = 2 B ~ p




























¿(~ p) 2 ¼
dz
with strict inequality if ¿(~ p) > 0, where ¿(¢) is the optimal decision rule for the time between
observations. Thus V 0(0) = ¹ V 0(0) = 0, V 00(0) > 0, and V 0(~ p) = 0, for ~ p > ¹ p and hence V is
not di®erentiable at ~ p = ¹ p.
22Notice that in this case at the boundary of the range of inaction the value function has
a kink, i.e. there is no smooth pasting. This di®ers from the model with menu cost only of
Section 4.2, which featured the smooth pasting property, typical of continuous-time ¯xed-cost
models, see e.g. Dixit (1993) and Stokey (2008).
Next, we compute an analytical approximation to the value function and optimal policies.
The approximation relies on the fact that V (¢) is symmetric around ~ p = 0, i.e. V (~ p) = V (¡~ p),
and hence all the derivatives of odd order are zero. Hence we approximate





2 + o(j~ pj
3)
since V 0(0) = V 000(0) = 0 and V 00(0) > 0. The other source of approximation is that we
let ½ converge to zero, although the second source is only to simplify the expressions. The
quadratic approximation for the value function is globally accurate if the range of inaction,
i.e. [¡¹ p; ¹ p], is small. Since ¹ p converges to zero as the menu cost Ã goes to zero, the
approximation will be accurate for small values of Ã relatively to Á. We will discuss the
accuracy of this approximation more in detail in the following paragraphs. Proposition 5
- Proposition 8 use these approximations to characterize the optimal decision rules, i.e. to
characterize the values of ¹ p, ^ ¿ and the function ¿(¢) in [¡¹ p; ¹ p].




^ ¿, then V 00(0); ¹ p, and ^ ¿ solve the recursive system:
¾
2Ã=B = f(^ ') ; ¾
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( Á + Ã 2(1 ¡ N(^ '))
¾2B
: (23)
Equation (22) and equation (23) can be thought of as the ¯rst order conditions for ¹ p and
^ ¿. The variable ^ ' is the minimum size (in absolute value) of the innovation of a standard
normal that is required to get out of the inaction region [¡¹ p; ¹ p] after resetting the price to
^ p = 0. An immediate corollary of Proposition 5 is that the optimal values of ^ ' and ¾2^ ¿ are
only functions of two parameters ¾2Á=B and ¾2Ã=B. Notice also that the expression for ^ ¿
in equation (23) is the same as the square root formula in Proposition 1 for the problem
with observation cost only, except that the cost Á has been replaced by the \expected" cost
23Á + Ã 2(1 ¡ N(^ ')). The expression 2(1 ¡ N(^ ')) is the probability of adjusting the price at
the end of the review period.
The previous proposition gives a recursive system of equations whose solution is the
optimal value of (^ ¿; ¹ p). The next proposition gives a su±cient condition for the existence
and uniqueness of the system, and provides some comparative statics. In fact, it turns out
that the approximations used in this section can only be used globally { i.e. for all ~ p { if
^ ' 2 (0;1), as it will become clear after Proposition 8. Thus, the next proposition restricts
attention to parameter settings so that there is a unique solution in this range.
Proposition 6. Let ^ ' ´ ¹ p=(¾
p
^ ¿). Assume that
Á
Ã ¸ 1=2 ¡ 2(1 ¡ N(1)) ¼ 0:1827. Then
there exist a unique value ^ '¤ 2 (0;1) that solves ¾2 Ã
B = f(^ '¤) de¯ned in equation (22). Also
let ^ ¿¤ be the solution of ^ ¿¤ = h(^ '¤)=¾2 de¯ned in equation (23). Then,
1. ^ '¤ is decreasing in Á, and ^ ¿¤ is increasing in Á,
2. ^ '¤ is decreasing in ¾2
B , and ¾2^ ¿¤ is increasing in ¾2
B with an elasticity ¸ 1=2,
3. @ ^ '¤=@ ¾2
B = 0 evaluated at ¾2
B = 0,
4. @ ^ '¤=@Ã > 0 if ¾2 Ã
B is small relative to Á.
The assumption in this proposition is that the observation cost must be su±ciently large
relative to the menu cost in order for the approximation to be globally valid {i.e. in order for
^ ' < 1{ for arbitrary values of ¾2=B. We can relax this assumption at the cost of imposing
a lower bound on the ¾2=B, which will depend on Ã and Á. The intuition for why we need
a condition like Á=Ã > 0:1827, is that the formulation of the problem presumes that after
adjusting the price the ¯rm waits for ^ ¿ > 0 periods before the next review, for which we
require a cost of observation, Á, non-negligible relative to the menu cost Ã. For instance
when Á = 0 the formulation of the problem is incorrect as the model becomes the menu cost
of Section 4.2, where ^ ¿ = 0 and price reviews happen continuously.
The comparative statics of part 2 shows that, in general, ^ '¤ is a decreasing function of
¾2=B. Part 3 shows that, in particular, around ¾2=B » = 0, the value ^ '¤ is non-responsive
to ¾2=B. It is interesting to consider in Proposition 6 the limit case of ¾ # 0. In this case,
the value of ^ '¤ converges to value in (0;1), but ^ ¿¤ goes to 1. This is quite intuitive: as the
target price can be predicted arbitrarily well, the time between observations is arbitrarily
large, but given the menu cost, there is still a range of inaction. For future reference we let
^ '0 be the solution to equation (22) and equation (23) when ¾2=B = 0. Notice that in this
24case the solution is just a function of the ratio of the two costs ® ´ Ã=Á, which we write as:
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We ¯nd that for the values of ¾2=B that we are interested in the function ^ '¤ is approxi-
mately constant with respect to ¾2=B, or putting it di®erently we are interested in relatively
small values of ¾2=B. To quantify what we mean by small, we display the values of ^ '¤ as a
function of the ratio ® = Ã=Á, for three values of ¾2=B, namely 0, 0:2=20, and 100 £0:2=20.
Notice that by de¯nition ^ '¤ = ^ '0 when ¾2=B = 0. Using the interpretation of the model as
an approximation to the problem of a ¯rm facing a constant demand elasticity, as explained
in Appendix A of the Appendix, we think of the value ¾ = 0:2 as the annual standard de-
viation of cost, as well as a value of B = 20, which in this context is implied by a markup
of about 15%, as of the righ order of magnitude. Then, the third value is just 100 times
the values we think of as reasonable. As it can be seen in Figure 2, the values of ^ '¤ under
di®erent ¾2=B are very similar for all values of ®.26 We summarize the result that, for the
Figure 2: ^ '¤ as a function of ® and ¾2=B




















Note: in this example we let Á vary, while Ã = 0:03.
range of interesting parameter values, the function ^ '¤ does not depend much on ¾2=B as
follows:
26As discussed before, the accuracy of our approximation also relies on relative small values of Ã.
25Proposition 7. Let ® ´ Ã=Á. For small values of ¾2 Ã
B, the normalized width of inaction
^ '(¾2 Á
B;¾2 Ã
B) is well approximated by ^ '0(®) which has elasticity:





at ® = 0 and





for ® > 0 : (25)
The optimal values for the time until next revision after an adjustment, ^ ¿¤ and the width of






























= ¹ p jÁ=0 : (27)
Proposition 7 shows that the expressions in equation (26) and equation (27) are the
generalizations of the corresponding formulas for the case in which there is only an observation
or a menu cost, respectively: for a given ratio of the cost ®, they have the same exact
functional form. The equations show that the length of time until the next revision, ^ ¿¤, is
higher in the model with both costs than in the model with observation cost only, and that
the width of the inaction band, ¹ p, is smaller than in the menu cost model.27 The reason why
^ ¿ is higher is that the introduction of the menu cost increases the cost of one price adjustment
(from Á to Á + Ã) but not the bene¯t. As a consequence ¯rms optimally economize on the
number of times they pay the cost. The reason why ¹ p is smaller than in the menu cost case
is more subtle. In the pure menu cost model observations are free, i.e. the ¯rm can monitor
when the state crosses the threshold at no cost. But with an observation cost this is not
true, and when the ¯rm discovers to be `su±ciently close' to the barrier she prefers to adjust
rather than having to pay again for observing when exactly the barrier is crossed. In other
words the barrier (both left and right) shifts inwards.
Finally, notice that the width of the inaction band has elasticity 1=4 with respect to ¾2=B,
as in the menu cost model, and that the time to the next review after a price adjustment
has elasticity equal to ¡1=2 with respect to B¾2. Using equation (25) into equation (26) and
27Also note that, from equation (26) and equation (25) it follows that ^ ¿¤ is weakly increasing in the ratio
of the cost ®, with elasticity less than 1/2.
26equation (27) we obtain the following elasticities with respect to the cost:
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Equation (28) says that the time to the next review after a price adjustment is increasing
in both costs. Equation (29) says that the width of the inaction band is increasing in Ã,
with an elasticity smaller than in the menu cost model, and decreasing in Á, since at the
time of an observation an agent facing a higher cost minimizes the chances of paying further
observation cost by narrowing the range of inaction.
We now turn to characterizing the remaining object de¯ning the decision rules, namely
the function ¿(¢) describing the time until the next review in the range of inaction.
Proposition 8. The optimal rule for the time to the next revision ¿(~ p) for prices in the
range of inaction is given by:






Figure 3: Policy rule ¿(~ p)

































p ¯ p ˆ p
Adjust p Adjust p
Nume.
Appx.
Note: parameter values are B = 20; ½ = 0:02; ¾ = 0:2;Á = 0:06, and Ã = 0:03; the approximated
solution for ¿(~ p) is given by Proposition 8; the numerical solution for ¿(~ p) is obtained from solving
the model on a grid of points for ~ p.
27Few comments are in order. First, the shape of the optimal decision rule depends only on
¾, and not on the rest of the parameters for the model, i.e. B; Á, and Ã. Second, if the agent
¯nds herself after a review with a price gap ~ p = 0, she will set ¿(0) = ^ ¿, since the optimal
adjustment would have implied a post adjustment price gap of zero. Third, the function ¿(~ p)
is decreasing in the (absolute value of) ~ p. If upon a review the agent ¯nds the price gap close
to the boundary of range of inaction, then she will plan for a review relatively soon, since
it is likely that the target will cross the threshold ¹ p. Fourth, the price gap is normalized by
the standard deviation of the changes in the target price ¾. This is also natural, since the
interest of the decision maker is on the likelihood that the price target will deviate and hit
the barriers, so that for a lower ¾ she is prepared to wait more for the same price gap ~ p.
Figure 3 plots the policy rule ¿(~ p) implied by Proposition 8 against the policy rule obtained
from the numerical solution of the model, both evaluated at a set of structural parameters
which we think as equally reasonable. The horizontal axis of Figure 3 displays the deviation
of ¯rm's price from the target, ~ p. The two vertical bars at ¡¹ p and ¹ p denote the threshold
values that delimit the inaction region. The vertical bar at ^ p, inside the inaction region,
denotes the optimal return point after an adjustment. As in the case of the approximation
solutions for ¹ p and ^ ¿, the approximation for ¿(¢) is very accurate, and we found this result
to be robust to all the economically interesting parameter values.
We discuss brie°y the type of error in the decision rules that is produced by our quadratic
approximation. Recall that the nature of the approximation used in this section is that the
value function ¹ V is assumed to be quadratic in ~ p, and also that we let ½ converge to zero.
Here we focus on the ¯rst feature, which turns out to be the most important. Since the
function ¹ V is symmetric and has a minimum at ~ p = 0, a quadratic approximation must be
accurate around ~ p = 0. Also, recall that Proposition 4 shows that the function is increasing
for all ~ p < ¹ p. Thus, since ¹ p tends to zero as Ã goes to zero, the relevant range of ¹ V , given
by [¡¹ p; ¹ p], is very small and hence the approximation very accurate if Ã is small. On the
other hand, when Ã is large relative to Á, the quality of the approximation deteriorates. In
particular, as Á goes to zero, the problem converges to the menu cost model analyzed in
Section 4.2. The value function ¹ V in the menu cost model is convex close to ~ p = 0, but then
it must be concave around ¹ p, to satisfy smooth pasting. As explained in Section 4.2 above,
this implies that V 0000(0) < 0. Thus, as Á becomes small relative to Ã, the value function ¹ V
becomes closer to the one of the menu cost, and hence our quadratic approximation of the
value function becames worse, especially for values of ~ p away from zero. In particular, since
our quadratic approximation has V 0000(0) = 0, it tends to be higher for values of ~ p away from
zero, and consequently the value of ¹ p that we obtain tends to be smaller. In Appendix C.6
we compare our analytical quadratic approximation for the value function and the thresholds
28with numerical solutions obtained of these objects. Finally, we notice that for small values
of Á=Ã the shape of ¿(¢) will be di®erent for values of ~ p away from zero. In particular, the
approximation that ¿(¢) is quadratic in the whole range will be less accurate for small values
of Á=Ã. In this case the true value of ¿ will be larger than the in the quadratic approximation
obtained in Proposition 8.
6 Statistics for the case with no-drift
In this section we characterize the implications for the following statistics of interest in the
case of no drift: frequency of price revisions, frequency of price adjustment, distribution of
price adjustment, and hazard rate for price changes.
6.1 Average frequencies of review and adjustment
First we turn to the development of expressions for statistics of interest implied by this model
the frequency of price adjustments na, and the frequency of price reviews nr. First, we turn to
the characterization of the frequency of price adjustments. Let the function Ta(~ p), describe
the expected time needed for the price gap to get outside the range of inaction [¡¹ p ; ¹ p],
conditional on the state (right after a revision) equal to ~ p. This function solves the recursion:
Ta(~ p) = ¿(~ p) +















for ~ p 2 [¡¹ p ; ¹ p]. Since after a price adjustment the price gap ~ p is zero, then Ta(0) is the
expected time between price adjustments. By the fundamental theorem of renewal theory,
the average number of price adjustments per unit of time is given by na = 1=Ta(0).
In the next proposition we derive analytical approximation for the expected time between
adjustments as function of only two arguments: ^ ' ´ ¹ p=(¾
p
^ ¿) and ^ ¿. The nature of the
approximation is that we replace the function Ta(~ p), that is symmetric around ~ p = 0 and has
zero odd derivatives at ~ p = 0, by a quadratic function; moreover, based on Proposition 8, we
use ¿(~ p) = ^ ¿ ¡ (~ p=¾)2.
Proposition 9. Let ¹ ' ´ ^ '=
p
1 ¡ ^ '2 and let ¿(~ p) be given by Proposition 8. The
frequency of price adjustments is na = 1=Ta(0), where Ta(0) = ^ ¿ A(^ '), and:
A(^ ') ¼
(1 ¡ ^ '2)





0 (¹ ' ¡ s)
2 dN(s) ¡ ¹ '2
´
1 ¡ N(^ ') +
R ^ '
0 s2dN(s) + ^ 'n(^ ')
1
A (32)
29where A(0) = 1, the approximation for A(^ ') is strictly increasing for 0 · ^ ' · ^ 'sup, ^ 'sup ¼
0:75, and where A(^ 'sup) ¼ 1:8.
The value ^ 'sup delimits the range over which the approximation is accurate. Clearly
Proposition 9 implies that keeping ^ ' ¯xed the expected time between price adjustments is
increasing in ^ ¿. The higher ^ ', the larger the expected time between price adjustments for
given ^ ¿.
Next we turn to the expected time between reviews. As an intermediate step we write
a recursion for the distribution of the price gaps upon review (and before adjustment), for


































for all ~ p 2 [¡¹ p ; ¹ p], where n(¢) is the density of a standard normal.28 The ¯rst term on the
right side of this equation gives the mass of ¯rms with values of the price gap p that in last
review were in the inaction region, and drew shocks to transit from p to ~ p = p ¡ s¾
p
¿(p)
during ¿(p) periods. The second term has the mass of ¯rms that in the last review were
outside the inaction region, and hence started with a price gap of zero, so that 1¡
R ¹ p
¡¹ p g(p)dp
is the fraction of reviews that end up outside the range of inacion, and hence trigger an
adjustment. For future reference, notice that equation (33) does not use the values of g(¢)
outside the range of inaction. With the knowledge of the distribution g, the expected time












Similarly to Proposition 9, we derive analytical approximation for the expected time
between reviews as function of only ^ ' ´ ¹ p=(¾
p
^ ¿) and ^ ¿. In particular, we replace the
density g(~ p), that is symmetric around ~ p = 0 and has zero odd derivatives at ~ p = 0, by a
quadratic function, and use ¿(~ p) = ^ ¿ ¡ (~ p=¾)2. We establish the following:
Proposition 10. Let ¹ ' ´ ^ '=
p
1 ¡ ^ '2 and let ¿(~ p) be given by Proposition 8. The
average frequency of price reviews is nr = 1=Tr where Tr = ^ ¿ R(^ '), and:












1 + '2d'; (35)
28 Notice that 1
¾
p
¿(p) n(¢) is the probability density of ~ p conditional on p, where ~ p = p ¡ s ¾
p
¿(p) .
30where q(0) and q00(0) are known functions of ¹ ' given in Appendix C.11, and where R(0) = 1,
the approximation for R(^ ') strictly decreasing for 0 · ^ ' · ^ 'sup where ^ 'sup ¼ 0:65, and
R(^ 'sup) ¼ 0:96.
Proposition 10 implies that keeping ^ ' ¯xed the expected time between price reviews is
increasing in ^ ¿. However, the higher ^ ', the smaller R(^ '), and the smaller the expected time
between price reviews for given ^ ¿.
Figure 4 plots A(^ '), R(^ ') and nr
na as a function of ^ ' as de¯ned in equation (32) and
equation (35), against their numerical counterparts. Several results are worth mentioning.
Figure 4: A(^ '), R(^ ') and
A(^ ')
R(^ ') as a function of ^ '

























Note: A(^ ') and R(^ ') computed numerically on a grid, as described in Appendix C.10-
Appendix C.11.
First, the approximations in equation (32) and equation (35) are very close to their numerical
counterparts, and basically coincide for ^ ' small enough. Second, A(¢) is strictly increasing
in ^ ', while R(¢) is strictly decreasing in ^ '.29
An important implication of Proposition 9 and Proposition 10 is that the ratio of the




A(^ '), only depends on ^ '. This result is very useful because, according to our model,
we can directly identify the values of ^ ', and ^ ¿, from observations of the average frequency of
price adjustment and the average frequency of price review. In addition, from Proposition 6
we know that ^ ' is roughly determined by the relative cost of reviewing relative to adjusting
29This monotonicity of A(¢) and R(¢) applies for all values of ^ ' · 1 that we computed numerically.
31prices, ® =
Ã
Á. Therefore, we have obtained a very tight relationship between the relative
frequency of price review to adjustment and the relative cost of review to adjustment. By
applying these results to the interpretation of observations in Figure D.2, we could attribute
equal increases in the average frequencies of adjustment and review either to an increase in the
volatility of the state, ¾, or to an increase in the curvature coe±cient of the pro¯t function,
B, or to a parallel decrease in the costs of review and adjustment, Ã and Á. However, changes
in the ratio of the two frequencies could roughly only be due to changes in the ratio of the
costs of review and adjustment.
Proposition 11. Assume that ¾2 Ã=B is small so that approximating ^ ' using ^ '0 is
accurate. Then the elasticities of the number of price adjustments and revisions with respect




@ log ^ '0(®)
@ log®
µ
1 ¡ ^ '0 (®)






















@ log ^ '0(®)
@ log®
µ
1 ¡ ^ '0 (®)
R0 (^ '0 (®))
R(^ '0 (®))
¶
· 0 and = ¡
1
2










Notice that equation (37) and equation (39) imply that an increase of Á and Ã in the
same percentage, decreases the number of adjustments and the number of reviews na and
nr in half of that percentage. Note that this one half elasticity is the one present in the
models described in Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 that feature either information cost only or
menu cost only. Furthermore, we remark that while an increase in the information cost Á
decreases the ratio nr=na, so each adjustment corresponds to fewer observations, the elasticity
of na with respect to Á displayed in equation (36) is negative, showing that observations are
complement to adjustments. In Appendix C.12 we report results about the elasticities of nr
and na with respect to Ã and Á evaluated numerically at di®erent values of ®. These results
are consistent with Proposition 11.
6.2 Average size and distribution of price changes
Next we derive expressions for the average size of price change, E[ j¢pj ], and for the distri-
bution of price changes. The average size of price adjustment equals the average price-gap
32upon review, conditional on that average gap being outside the range of inaction. Thus, to
compute this average we extend g(¢), de¯ned in equation (33), to the values outside the range
of inaction. Since the distribution of price changes has to be conditional on a price change,
and the price change happens with probability [1 ¡
R ¹ p





































for j¢pj 2 (¹ p;1). The average size of price change is then given by E[ j¢pj ] = 2
R 1
¹ p z w(z)dz.
The distribution of price changes w(¢) is composed of two terms: the ¯rst term is positive
and strictly decreasing in j¢pj; the second term is the density of a normal distribution with
zero mean and standard deviation equal to ¾
p
^ ¿. Therefore, conditional on adjusting prices,
w(¢) assigns relatively more weight to values of j¢pj that are closer to ¹ p than the normal
distribution. Moreover, w(¢) is symmetric around zero, as both the normal distribution and
the distribution of the price gaps upon review, g(¢), are symmetric. The next proposition
characterizes this distribution, and some related statistics, as a function of the parameters
for the optimal decision rules.
Proposition 12. Consider an optimal decision rule described by two parameters
(^ ¿; ^ ') and where, in the range of inaction, ¿(p) is given by the approximation described
in Proposition 8, namely ¿(p) = ^ ¿ ¡ (p=¾)2. De¯ne ¹ ' ´ ^ '=
p
1 ¡ ^ '2, and let x denote the
normalized price changes: x ´ ¢p=(¾
p
^ ¿). Then
E[ j¢pj ] = ¾
p
^ ¿ E[ jxj ; ¹ '] ; (41)
E[ jxj ; ¹ '] = 2
Z 1
¹ '










¹ ' x v(x ; ¹ ') dx
2 [0;1] : (43)
where the density v(x; ¹ ') of the normalized price changes solves:





















+ n(x) for jxj > ¹ '; and = 0 otherwise :
33This proposition, together with the previous characterization of (^ ¿; ^ ') as functions of
the parameters of the problem, completely characterizes the distribution of price changes. In
particular, notice that using the approximations developed in Proposition 7, for ^ ', and hence
¹ ', in equation (24) and for ^ ¿ in equation (26), we can write the average price change as:



















. Notice that, holding constant the ratio of the
two costs, ®, this expression has the same comparative static with respect to a change in
both cost (Ã;Á), and to a change in (B;¾2) than the one for the models with observation
cost only or with menu cost only. Finally, notice that equation (44) implies that the ratio of











¹ '(®) x v(x ; ¹ '(®)) dx, and where ¹ '(®) ´ ^ '0(®)=
p
1 ¡ ^ '0(®)2. Thus
the \shape" of the distribution depends on the ratio of the two cost. This result provides an
additional identi¯cation scheme for ® from observation of statistics about the distribution of
price changes.
Figure 5 plots the distribution of price changes implied by our model against the one
predicted by the special cases of observation cost and menu cost only, under a parametrization
of the model that we think of reasonable. Table 3 reports some key statistics from the
distribution of the size of price changes in the three models. Parameters are such that the
three models imply the same frequency of price changes, i.e. 1.5 adjustments per year. In
comparing the distributions of price changes from these models, several results are worth
mentioning. First, our model assigns a zero probability to price changes smaller than ¹ p in
absolute value, while the model with observation cost only assigns a positive probability mass
also at arbitrary small price changes. Second, our model with both types of costs has a mode
at §¹ p, while the model with observation costs only has a mode at zero. Finally, our model
cannot generate price changes having fatter tails than innovations in p¤. Therefore, being
innovations normally distributed, our model with both costs implies a platykurtic distribution
of price changes.
We note that the distribution of price changes in our model is obviously di®erent from the
one implied by the model with menu cost only, where price changes occur only at a size equal
to ¹ p. In fact, the plain menu cost model implies a bi-modal distribution of price changes.
34Figure 5: Distribution of price changes, conditional on a price change





















Table 3: Statistics of the invariant distribution of price changes in absolute value across
di®erent models






Both Costs: 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.11 0.00
Menu Cost: 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.00
Observation Cost: 0.13 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.30 0.16
Data:
Midrigan (2007)¤: 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.19 0.34 0.12
Alvarez et al. (2005)¤¤: 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.05
Note: Benchmark parameter values for the model with two cost are: B = 20; ½ = 0:02; ¾ =
0:2; Ã = 0:03; Á = 0:06; in the model with menu cost only and observation cost only, we set Ã =
0:06; Á = 0, and Ã = 0; Á = 0:18 respectively, while leaving the other parameters unchanged, so to
obtain the same frequency of price adjustment of the model with both costs, i.e. 1.5 adjustments a
year. ¤ These numbers are obtained from Table 1 in Midrigan (2007) and refer to AC Nielsen data
on non-sale prices. ¤¤ These numbers are obtained from authors' computations on data displayed
in Figure 8 by Alvarez et al. (2005).
Our model predicts a distribution of price changes that resembles the bi-modal, as it puts
a lot of weight to price changes close to ¹ p in absolute value, but also assigns some positive
35probability to price changes of size larger than ¹ p. Hence, the average size of price changes in
the model with both observation and menu costs is larger than ¹ p.
The shape of the distribution of price changes implied by our model resembles in many
aspects the distribution of price changes estimated by several empirical studies.30. In addition,
statistics in Table 3 indicate that the distribution of price changes in our model is consistent,
at least qualitatively, with some of the statistics reported by Midrigan (2007) and Alvarez
et al. (2005). In particular, at given parameters, our model with both costs does a very
good job at explaining the average size, volatility and percentiles of the distribution of price
changes. The statistics in last two columns of Table 3 are informative about the mass of
small price changes in the distribution. When comparing our model with the menu and
observation costs only models, we notice that our model implies less mass of price changes at
values smaller than a half and a quarter of the average, than the mass implied by the normal
distribution in the model with observation costs only. At the same time however, our model
allows for smaller price changes than the menu cost model would imply. When comparing
these statistics to the data, we see that our model implies too little mass of small price
changes. This does not mean necessarily that our model cannot replicate these statistics, but
just signals that, at the parameter values we choose, there is relatively too much menu cost
than the data would support.
6.3 The hazard rate
Finally we turn to the analysis of the hazard rate of price changes in the model with both
review and menu costs. In Section 4.1 and Section 4.2 we have shown that, for the models
with only one type of cost, the hazard rate of a price change is monotone increasing on the
time elapsed since the last change. We now show that the hazard rate of price changes with
both costs is not monotone on the time elapsed since the last change.
We develop some notation to describe the mechanics of the construction of the hazard
rate of price adjustments. Let t denote the time elapsed since the last price adjustment, and
let S(t) be the survival probability, i.e. the fraction of spells of unchanged prices that are
of length t or longer. The instantaneous hazard rate is then de¯ned as h(t) = ¡S0(t)=S(t).
We ¯x a value of ¾ and the decision rule described by ¹ p and the symmetric function ¿(p)
de¯ned in ¿ : [0; ¹ p] ! [¿; ^ ¿], where ¿ = ¿(¹ p). We construct the hazard rate for the interval
t 2 [0; ^ ¿ +minf^ ¿ + 2¿g]. We let p(t0) ´ ¿¡1(t0) be the inverse of ¿(¢) so that ¿¡1(t0) : [¿; ^ ¿] !
30Alvarez et al. (2005) estimate the distribution of price changes for the Euro area and obtain a shape that
is very much similar to ours; Cavallo (2009) ¯nds that the distribution of the size of price changes in four
Latin American countries is roughly bimodal, with few changes close to zero percent;Midrigan (2007) also
¯nds similar results from AC Nielsen data. See Appendix D.3 for more details on empirical evidence about
the distribution of price changes.
36[¹ p;0].
To characterize the hazard rate we start with a large set of ¯rms that have that just
adjusted their price and describe the sequence of events that will take so that they adjust
to a new price. First, notice that until ^ ¿ period no ¯rm will review its price, and hence no
adjustments will take place, so that S(t) = 1 and the hazard rate is zero for t 2 [0; ^ ¿). At ^ ¿ all
the ¯rms review their prices, and a fraction of them adjusts. This fraction is 2(1¡N(^ ')), i.e.
the probability that after the review the target is outside the range of inaction. Thus, there
is a jump down in the survivor function to S(^ ¿) = 2 N (^ ') ¡ 1, and thus the instantaneous
hazard rate is in¯nite at this point. For the remaining ¯rms that have review but not adjusted
their price, the time of the next review depends on the current price gap ~ p. The next review
among these ¯rms occurs ¿ periods after the ¯rst review, these are the ¯rms that have a price
gap inside the range of inaction but arbitrarily close to its boundary, i.e. very close to ¹ p or
¡¹ p. In general, we describe the number of ¯rms that change prices in their second review,
between times t = ^ ¿ + t and t + ¢, as approximately @S0(t0 + ^ ¿)=@dt £ ¢, satisfying:
































for ¿ < t0 < ^ ¿. The ¯rst term in square brackets is the fraction of those ¯rms that had price
gap ~ p > 0 at time ^ ¿ and that after the second review are outside the range of inaction, and
hence adjust their price. 31 The remaining term counts the number of ¯rms that have a price
gap ~ p = p(t0) so that they will adjust their price at ^ ¿ +t0. This, in turn, is made of two terms.
The second ratio is the density of innovations from time zero to time ^ ¿ necessary to end up
in the required value of the price gap p(t0). The derivative, @p(t0)=@t, comes from a change
of variables formula, to convert the density of prices into a density expressed with respect to
times. If ^ ¿ + ¿ > 2^ ¿, the expression for @S0(t0 + ^ ¿)=@dt is valid for all t 2 [^ ¿ + ¿;2^ ¿]. In this
case, since the symmetry of ¿(¢) implies that @¿(0)=@p = 0, then @p(^ ¿)=@t = 1, and thus
the hazard rate tends to in¯nity at the end of this interval, and reverts to zero afterwards. If
this conditions is not satis¯ed, the expression for the derivative of S for values higher than
^ ¿ +2¿ is more complex because a price change can occur at exactly the same time after two
or three reviews. We summarize these results in the next proposition:
Proposition 13. The hazard rate of price adjustments starts °at at zero, it jumps to
in¯nity at t = ^ ¿, it returns °at to zero in the segment t 2 (^ ¿; ^ ¿ + ¿), it jumps to a positive
value at ^ ¿+¿. In the segment [^ ¿+¿; ^ ¿+minf^ ¿;2¿g) stays strictly positive and, if ¿ > (1=2)^ ¿,
31This expression is multiplied by 2 to include the ¯rms with ~ p < 0 at time ^ ¿.
37tends to in¯nity at the end of this segment and returns to zero:
h(t) = 0; for t 2 [0; ^ ¿);
h(^ ¿) = 1;




0 < h(t) < 1; for t 2 [^ ¿ + ¿ ; ^ ¿ + minf^ ¿;2¿g)
if ^ ¿ · 2¿ : lim
t" 2^ ¿
h(t) = 1;
if ^ ¿ < 2¿ : h(t) = 0; for t 2 (2^ ¿; ^ ¿ + 2¿) :
The previous proposition does not characterize the survivor function or the hazard rate
when durations are longer than ^ ¿ + minf^ ¿;2¿g. While an expression can be developed for
the remaining values of elapsed times it becomes increasingly complex because, for higher
values of the elapsed time t, a price change can happen after several combinations of previous
reviews. Indeed the larger the value of t, the larger the number of combinations of di®erent
duration of previous reviews that can happen. The e®ect of this feature is that the hazard
rate for larger values of elapsed time t will tend to be lower but without the 'holes', i.e.
stretches with zero values that we have identi¯ed for low values of t in Proposition 13. We
illustrate these features in Figure 6 that displays the weakly hazard rate based on a large
number of simulations of the decision rule for the model. The red step-function like is the
weekly hazard rate obtained through simulations. In the simulations we compute a weekly
hazard rate, i.e. the fraction of price changes that occur during a week. We use this period
because it is the shortest time unit that can be estimated in actual price data, and that
avoids the in¯nite hazard rate at ^ ¿. 32 The black line is the analytical counterpart of the
hazard developed in Proposition 13 rate and expressed at weekly frequencies. We include
dotted vertical lines every ^ ¿ periods to note that every ^ ¿ periods there is a "wave" of price
adjustments. At t = ^ ¿ all the adjustments occur simultaneously, so the hazard rate has a
spike. In the subsequent waves, i.e. for larger values of t, they are less concentrated around
a single value, and hence the hazard rates have smaller spikes, but are higher in a wider
range.33 We compare the shape of the hazard rate function with the ones of the models with
observation cost only, which is given by a single spike (in green) and the model with menu
32Since at ^ ¿ there is a fraction of ¯rms adjusting all at that instant, in any ¯nite interval, such as a week,
the hazard rate will be ¯nite.
33We note that if the hazard rate where computed for changes during a month, as opposed to changes
during a week, the di®erences will be smaller.
38cost only (in blue).34 The latter is characterized by an increasing hazard rate in the ¯rst
weeks, but quickly converging to a constant rate.
Figure 6: Hazard Rate of Price Changes, weekly rates































Note: Benchmark parameter values for the model with two cost are: B = 20; ½ = 0:02; ¾ =
0:2; Ã = 0:03; Á = 0:06; in the model with menu cost only and observation cost only, we set Ã =
0:06; Á = 0, and Ã = 0; Á = 0:18 respectively, while leaving the other parameters unchanged, so to
obtain the same frequency of price adjustment of the model with both costs, i.e. 1.5 adjustments
a year.
There is no consensus in the existing literature about the shape of the hazard function.
For instance, both Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) show
that the hazard rate computed on U.S. CPI data is downward sloping, being at odd with menu
cost models of price adjustment. Similar evidence is reported by Alvarez et al. (2005) for
the Euro area. However, when adjusting for heterogeneity Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) and
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) reach opposite conclusions. The former ¯nds a °at hazard
rate, while the latter ¯nds a downward sloping hazard despite adjusting for heterogeneity.
Finally, a recent study by Cavallo (2009) shows that the hazard rate is upward sloping in
four Latin America countries.35 As shown above, a model with menu cost only produces an
upward sloping hazard. However, heterogeneity could account for the observed downward
sloping hazard rate if data was generated by this model. Our model with both observation
34The examples plotted for the three models have the same average number of 1.5 price changes per year.
35See Appendix D.4 for more details on empirical evidence about the hazard rate.
39and menu costs predicts a non-monotone hazard. Among other things, this implies that an
econometrician estimating the product level hazard rate on data generated from our model
could obtain an upward sloping or a downward sloping hazard rate depending on the length
of the sample, and on the frequency of observations within that sample, even in absence of
heterogeneity. For instance, an econometrician observing prices every ^ ¿ units of time would
estimate a downward sloping hazard rate. However, if for instance the econometrician were
only observing prices at any frequency between ^ ¿ + ¿ and 2^ ¿ he would obtain an upward
sloping hazard.
7 The case of positive in°ation
In this section we brie°y discuss the e®ect of in°ation ¼ > 0, the drift of the (log of the )
target price p¤ into the solution of the problem studied above. First we establish that in the
presence of in°ation, immediately after an adjustment the price gap will be positive, i.e. the
agent will set a price higher than value of the target at the time of the adjustment. This is
quite intuitive, since the agent expect to adjust in the future and hence it compensate for
the forecastable part of the deviation due to in°ation. Indeed, the optimal value for ^ p is to
exceed the current value of the target p¤ by an amount that is approximately equal to the
expected value that p¤(t) will take at approximately half of the expected time until its next
adjustment.
For the next proposition set, without loss of generality, the current time at t = 0, and
assume that the agent will adjust the price at this time. Also, without loss of generality we
set p¤ = 0. Let ¹ T be a stopping time indicating the time of the next price adjustment. Notice
that ¹ T is the sum of the time elapsed between consecutive reviews with not adjustment plus
the time until review and adjustment.
Proposition 14. Let ^ p be optimal price set after an adjustment exceeds the value of
the target p¤, and let ¹ T the time elapsed between price adjustments. As ½ goes to zero, the














where W(t) is a standard Brownian motion, with W(0) = 0. Thus, ¯xing Á > 0, for
su±ciently small Ã, the value of ^ p is strictly positive.
The terms in equation (47) are intuitive if you ¯rst consider the case where the time to
the next adjustment is deterministic, so that ¹ T has a degenerate distribution. In this case
40we obtain: ^ p = ¼ ¹ T=2, so that the initial gap is equal to the value that the target will have
exactly at half of the time until the next adjustment, so the ¯rst half of the time deviations
are positive, and the second negative. To understand the expression for ^ p in the case in which
¹ T is random and unrelated with fW(t)g, consider the following simple example. Let ¹ T = ^ T
with probability q and otherwise ¹ T = ² where we let ² to go to zero. In this case there is an
immediate adjustment with probability 1 ¡ q and otherwise the next adjustment happen in
exactly ^ T periods. Notice that the value of ^ p is irrelevant in the case that the adjustment is
immediate, so its determination should be governed by ^ T. But in this case the same logic
than the one in the purely deterministic case applies, and hence we should set ^ p = ^ T=2.
Finally, notice that the general expression in equation (47) gives the correct answer in this
particular case, since E[¹ T] = q ^ T and E[¹ T 2] = q ^ T 2, and hence we obtain again that ^ p = ^ T=2.
In our model the stopping time for adjustment ¹ T is a function of the path of fW(t)g. Thus,
the condition that Ã is small, reduces the depedence of ¹ T on its path, ensuring that the ¯rst
term in equation (47) dominates the expression of ^ p. Notice that if Ã = 0, the value of ¹ T is
indeed deterministic, and hence the second term is exactly zero.
7.1 \Low In°ation"
In this section we give a partial characterization of the e®ect that a low in°ation rate has in
the decision rules. We focus on the e®ect of a low in°ation rate on the value of ^ ¿, the optimal
time until the next revision decided right after a price adjustment and show that this feature
of the decision rule changes very little for small in°ation, i.e. that its derivative with respect
to the in°ation rate is zero when evaluated at zero in°ation rate. This is to be contrasted
with ^ p, the value of the price gap right after a price adjustment, which has a strictly positive
derivative with respect to the in°ation rate. Thus, loosely speaking, the e®ect of a small
in°ation rate is concentrated on the size of the price changes rather than on the frequency
of changes.
Proposition 15. Let ^ ¿ be optimal time until the next observation set right after a price
adjustment, and let ^ p the optimal price gap set right after a price adjustment, both as a
function of the in°ation rate. We have:
@^ p
@¼
j¼=0 > 0 and
@^ ¿
@¼
j¼=0 = 0 : (48)
We note that the zero derivative of ^ ¿ with respect to in°ation at zero in°ation is also a feature
of the problem with observation cost only, as shown in Proposition 1. Below we illustrate
this proposition by computing the decision rule for some numerical examples displayed in
41Figure 7 and Table 4 for di®erent in°ation rates.
7.2 \High" In°ation
In this section we consider the case where ¼ is large relative to ¾. I particular, we consider
the limit when ¾ # 0 and ¼ > 0. We study this case as an approximation of the solution
when in°ation is large relative to the volatility of the idiosyncratic shocks.
In such a case, i.e. when there is no uncertainty the optimal policy is to review once,
and after the ¯rst price adjustment the optimal policy is to adjust prices every ¿¤ periods,
by exactly the same amount. This is version of the classical price adjustment model by
Sheshinski and Weiss (1977). The optimal policy can also be written in terms of the price
gap, following a sS band, adjusting the price when a lower barrier p is reached, to a value
given by ^ p. We can also add a function ¿(~ p) function indicating the time of the next review
when the current price gap is ~ p.
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¹ p ¡ ^ p
=
p
3 ; ¿(~ p) =
~ p ¡ p
¼
if ~ p 2 [p; ¹ p] and ¿(~ p) = 1=na otherwise: (49)
In the deterministic case with Á > 0, the reviews will never be conducted unless there
is an adjustment, and this is precisely the logic behind the linear decreasing shape of the
function ¿(¢) in the proposition. In the range of inaction, ¿(~ p) is exactly the time it takes
until the next adjustment. This is in stark contrast with the symmetric shape of ¿(¢) in
the case with no drift. In this deterministic case the cost of each adjustment is given by
the sum Á + Ã, due to our assumption that a review has to be conducted at the time of an
adjustment. In the limit case of Proposition 16 the frequency of adjustments has an elasticity
of 1/3 with respect to the cost Á + Ã. This is di®erent from the the case of zero drift, where
the number of adjustment have 1/2 elasticity with respect to an equal proportional change in
the costs Á and Ã. The optimal return point is strictly positive, and increasing in in°ation,
an application of the general result of Proposition 14. The optimal return point ^ p and the
lower bound of the range of inaction p are at the same distance of the value that minimizes
the static price gap, i.e. ^ p = ¡p. This feature is very intuitive, since for ½ = 0 the agent
gives the same weight to the deviations that occur just after adjusting as those just before
the next adjustment. This also di®ers from the optimal return of zero of the model with no
42drift. The boundaries of the range of inaction are asymmetric: (^ p ¡ p)=(¹ p ¡ ^ p) =
p
3 > 1.
This asymmetry is due to the fact that ^ p > 0 already takes into account the e®ect of positive
in°ation, and hence at ¹ p the deviation from the static optimum value of ~ p are very large.
Our interest in the function ¿(¢) and the thresholds ¹ p; ^ p and p in this limit is that it should
be informative about the shape of ¿(¢) for very small, but strictly positive, values of ¾, and
in general for the forces that operates in the general case of ¼ and ¾ strictly positive.
Figure 7: Policy rule ¿(~ p) under di®erent values of drift, ¼ = 0:05;0:2;0:6
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Note: Benchmark parameter values are: B = 20; ¾ = 0:2; Ã = 0:03; ½ = 0:02; Á = 0:06; each
panel shows optimal ¿(~ p) under a given value of ¼.
To evaluate the extent to which the features discussed in this limit are present in the
case of strictly positive ¼ and ¾ Figure 7 displays three panels where, for ¯xed values of all
the parameters {including ¾ = 0:2{, we display the shape of the optimal decision rules for
three strictly positive levels of the in°ation rate. It is clear that for in°ation rate of 4% the
di®erence with the shape for zero in°ation is very small, but already we can see that the range
of inaction starts being asymmetric, that the optimal return point is positive, and that ¿(¢)
is asymmetric, with a peak at the right of the optimal return point, and with ¿(p) < ¿(¹ p).
These features are more apparent for 20 % in°ation rate, and very descriptive for 80 % annual
in°ation rate.
437.3 Price adjustments with no observations
In this section we relax the assumption on the `technology' to change prices that at the time
of a price adjustment agents must observe the state. We show that in the case where the
state has no drift it is indeed optimal to observe every time a price is adjusted. On the other
hand, as the volatility goes to zero relatively to the drift it is optimal to do some adjustments
without observing the state.
We consider an extension of the problem where upon paying a cost Á, and ¯nding the
value of the price gap ~ p in a review the ¯rm can decide whether to immediately change the
price, paying the cost Ã or not. The extension consist of allowing the ¯rm to consider to
adjust several times it price until the next review. For these adjustments the ¯rm pays only
the cost Ã. In this case the Bellman equations for a ¯rm just after ¯nding the value of price
gap ~ p satisfy:


































V (^ pn ¡ ¼¿n ¡ s
p
¿n¾)dN(s) ; (50)
V (~ p) = min
n¸0
Vn(~ p) (51)
where 0 · ¿i · ¿i+1 and where for n = 0 we denote ^ p0 = ~ p. The function Vn(~ p) gives the
optimal value conditional on making n price adjustment before the next review, which will
take place ¿n units of time from the current review. The ¯rst term in the right hand side of
Vn(~ p) corresponds to the losses incurred if there is no immediate price adjustment. Notice
that if the ¯rm chooses ¿0 = 0, the time for which this loss is incurred is nil, and hence a price
adjustment is conducted immediately. The next sum contains the losses corresponding to the
n price adjustments. These n price adjustments are conducted using only the information of
the initial price gap ~ p. Notice that V0(~ p) is the value of conducting a review and no price
adjustment.36 The value function V minimizes the cost by choosing whether to have an
immediate price adjustment or not, and by minimizing on the number of price adjustments
conducted between reviews. If we restrict this problem to have to have n = 1 every time
¿0 = 0, we will obtain exactly the same value functions as considered in the previous sections.
As a preliminary step we discuss the sense in which multiple price adjustment between
price observations looks like indexation. Consider the case of equation (50) for n ¸ 3. In
36In the previous section we refer to this as ¹ V .
44particular, ¯xing the other choices for this problem, consider the ¯rst order condition for ^ pi,
^ pi+1 and ¿i for 0 < i < n. The restriction that 0 < i < n means that the price adjustments
^ pi and ^ pi+1 take place at times ¿i¡1 > 0 and ¿i, and that there is still one more adjustment
before the next observation. After some algebra the following expressions, as we let, for
simplicity, ½ # 0:
^ pi = ¼
¿i+1 + ¿i
2







thus the price chosen increase exactly with accumulated in°ation, and the adjustment are
equally spaced in time.
We discuss two extreme cases that imply in¯nitely many adjustments between observa-
tions. First, let the adjustment cost Ã # 0. In this case the ¯rm will be adjusting in¯nitely
often, so that the optimal number of adjustment between reviews will have n ! 1 and the
adjustment will be converging to ^ pi = ¼¿i. In this case the value function will converge to
the value function for the problem with observation cost only of Section 4.1 and no drift on
the state, i.e. ¼ = 0. Thus, as the menu cost is small, and the drift is large, the optimal
policy will involve more adjustments than reviews, contrary to what is found in the survey
evidence discussed in Section 3. The second case is one where ¾ # 0. This case coincides
with the model in Section 7.2, whose solution is characterized in Proposition 16, except that
we now set Á = 0. The intuition is clear, if there is no uncertainty, there is no need to pay
the cost Á to observe the state.
The next proposition shows that if ¼ is su±ciently close to zero, there is at most one price
adjustment between reviews, i.e. the ¯rm will not ¯nd optimal to adjust without observing
the price gap. Moreover, in such a case price adjustment will happen immediately upon
a observation. The logic of the result that there is at most one price adjustment between
reviews is simplest in the case of ¼ = 0. In this case, it is immediate to see that the value
function V is symmetric around zero. Using this symmetry it is easy to see that, if a price
adjustment will take place in the problem for Vn(~ p), the price gap will be adjusted to zero.37
Notice that in the absence of drift the expected price gap until the next observation remains
zero. Thus it is not optimal to have any further price adjustments as long as Ã > 0, i.e.
Vn(~ p) > minfV0(~ p);V1(~ p)g for n ¸ 2. By a continuity argument, along the lines of the
Thoerem of the maximum, the value function for ¼ positive, but small, is close to the one
for zero in°ation, and hence ^ p is also close to zero. Again, having more than one adjustment
between reviews will increase the cost by a discrete amount Ã, unrelated to ¼, and thus
the argument extend to the case of small but positive in°ation. A more subtle point is to
37This can be seen as a straightforward modi¯cation of the argument in the proof of Proposition 14.
45argue that for small but positive in°ation optimal price adjustments occur immediately upon
review. The argument against the optimality of a delayed adjustment is that during the ¯rst
part of the period, of length ¿0 in the notation of this section, the ¯rm is having a loss of
the order of the price gap. Since this case is only relevant outside the range of inaction, the
price gap is non trivial and thus the loss is large relative to ¼. We have sketched the proof
of the following proposition:
Proposition 17. Fix all the parameters, including Ã > 0 and ¾ > 0. Then there is a
strictly positive in°ation rate ¹ ¼ > 0 such that for all in°ation rates j¼j < ¹ ¼ it is optimal to
adjust prices at most once between successive reviews, and when it is optimal to adjust the
price changes take place immediately after a price review.
In words, Proposition 17 shows that the decision rules computed in Section 7.2 are op-
timal for the problem de¯ned in equations (50)-(51) for a small enough in°ation rate. One
interpretation of adjusting several times between observations is that the ¯rm is indexing its
price, or setting a plan, or a price path. Notice that in our set up, setting a plan or a path
is costly, since it involves several price changes, each of them costing Ã. But also notice that
menu cost are not the only cost, there are also observations cost Ã. Thus we ¯nd this set
up a useful benchmark to think about the bene¯t of indexation. In this sense, the previous
proposition just says that if in°ation is small relative to the menu cost, indexation is not
optimal.
A simple calculation may help understand why relatively high in°ation is required for
more than one adjustment to take place between observations. Let V be the value function
obtained in the problem where ¯rms have to pay the observation cost at the time of an
adjustment. Consider the benchmark case where the ¯rm is paying the observation cost and
changing the price for ¼ > 0. We want to compare the value of the minimization of the
Bellman equation when the ¯rm is allowed to change the price several times until the new
observation, paying the cos Ã each time. We will compute an upper bound on the savings
of such policy. The upper bound is computed assuming that, until the next observation at
^ ¿ the ¯rm adjusts the price continuously. We will compare that with the cost that will be
incurred if the price gap will be set to zero right after the observation and until the next














where the inequality comes from disregarding discounting, i.e. setting ½ = 0. For the
parameter values we use, say B = 20, Ã = 0:03, Á = 0:06, ¾ = 0:2, and ¼ = 0:1 we obtain
46^ ¿ ¼ :45, see Figure 7, and hence the savings from adjusting continuously will be about
¼2 B ^ ¿3
3 ¼ 0:006 for 10 % in°ation rate. Thus these savings are not even enough to pay the
cost of one extra adjustment Ã = 0:03 for this example. In fact, the cost savings are most
surely smaller, since ^ p in the benchmark case will be set at a slightly positive value.
Table 4 computes numerically the value for ¹ ¼ for three set of parameter values, for which
we also report statistics about the average frequencies of price changes and reviews as well
as the time to next review after an adjustment. The three cases are our baseline parameter-
ization and two other ones with either half the menu cost or half the volatility. For each of
these three cases we report the statistics for zero in°ation, ¯ve percent, and ¹ ¼, as de¯ned in
Proposition 17.
Table 4: Statistics of the model as a function of ¼
¼ = 0 ¼ = 0:05 ¼ = ¹ ¼
¹ ¼ na nr ^ ¿ na nr ^ ¿ na nr ^ ¿
Baseline: 0.20 1.47 2.31 0.45 1.51 2.31 0.44 1.65 2.45 0.42
Low ¾: 0.05 0.74 1.14 0.89 0.79 1.19 0.86 0.79 1.19 0.86
Low Ã: 0.12 1.77 2.41 0.42 1.79 2.42 0.42 1.84 2.47 0.41
Note: Baseline parameter values are: B = 20; ¾ = 0:2; Ã = 0:03; ½ = 0:02; Á = 0:06; the
'Low ¾' case corresponds to ¾ = 0:1, everything else being equal; the 'Low Ã' case corresponds to
Ã = 0:015, everything else being equal.
Table 4 shows that the statistics are not very sensitive to changes in the level of in°ation,
for each of the three parametrization of the model. This low sensitivity is consistent with the
zero derivative of ^ ¿ for low in°ation shown in Proposition 15. In addition, ¹ ¼ decreases both
in ¾ and Ã, as suggested by the two extreme cases analyzed above where these parameter
where set to zero. Additionally is worth mentioning that the level of in°ation ¹ ¼ where the
agents are indi®erent between following the policies outlined in the previous section and the
one allowed in this section, agent's don't ¯nd advantageous to adjust multiple times between
observations. What they are indi®erent to do at ¼ = ¹ ¼ is for some values of ~ p to observe,
don't adjust for ¿0 > periods, make an adjustment at ¿1, and observe at ¿2 > ¿1. It will take
even higher in°ation rates so that ¯rms will like to adjust prices more than once between
observations.
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52A Price Setting in the frictionless case
We consider two simple static problems for a monopolist ¯rm. The ¯rst has a linear system,
the second is a log approximation to a general case.
A.1 Linear Demand
Let the demand for a product be q(p) = a ¡ b p where q are quantities and p is the price,
a the intercept, b is the slope. Assume that the marginal cost is constant at the value of c.
Thus pro¯ts are ¦(p) = (a ¡ b p)(p ¡ c), and the static monopoly price is given by
p
¤ =
a + c b
2b
;





(¡2 b)(p ¡ p
¤)
2 = b (p
¤)
2 ¡ c a ¡ b (p ¡ p
¤)
2 :
A.2 Log approximation of monopolist pro¯t function
Let ¦(P) be the pro¯t function of the monopolist as a function of the price P. Let P ¤ be
the optimal price, satisfying ¦P(P ¤) = 0. Consider a second order approximation of the log




















A useful example for this approximation is the case with a constant elasticity of demand
equal to ´ > 1 where: q(P) = E P ¡´ where E is a demand shifter and where the monopolist













= ¡´ (´ ¡ 1)
So, letting B = ¡´ (´¡1), p = logP and p¤ = logP ¤ we obtain the problem in the body
of the paper.
A.3 Non-linear Price Setting Model
In this section we describe a fully non-linear price setting model. Let the instantaneous pro¯t
of a monopolist be as in Appendix A, where the cost C and the relative price is P. We solve
this model numerically and compare its predictions with the simple tracking problem of the
paper. [TO BE REPORTED IN FUTURE DRAFTS]. This model also helps to interpret Ã
and Á in the tracking problem as cost in proportion to the period pro¯t.
At the time of the observation we let the general price level be one. This price level
increases at the rate ¼ per unit of time. The log of constant margnal cost in real terms
53evolve as a random walk with innovation variance ¾2 and with drift ¹. The demand has
constant elasticity ´ with respect to the price P relative to the general price level. Thus the




where A is a constant the determined the level of demand. The nominal mark-up t period
after is then
³




, where s(t) is a standard normal random variable. Thus








. The pro¯t level, if prices
are chosen to maximize the instantaneous pro¯t when real cost are C and the general price
level is one are given by ¦¤(C) ´ A C1¡´ (´=(´ ¡ 1))
¡´ (1=(´ ¡ 1)). The corresponding
Bellman equation is:
v(P;C) = maxf^ v(C) ; ¹ v(P;C)g
^ v(C) = ¡(Á + Ã)¦
¤(C) +
max

































































This Bellman equation is very similar to the one we solve numerically in Alvarez et al. (2009)
for a saving and portfolio problem for households. As in the problem of that paper, it is
easy to show that the value function is homogenous of degree 1 ¡ ´. In this case we can
simplfy the problem considering only one state, say P=C. We can develop the expectations
and collect terms to obtain:
^ v(C) = ¡(Á + Ã)¦
¤(C) +
max




























and likewise for ¹ v. Letting a modi¯ed discount factor to be ~ ½ ´ ½ ¡ (1 ¡ ´)(¹ + ¾2=2) and
54using that v is homogeneous of degree 1 ¡ ´:
^ v(1)
¦¤(1)
= ¡(Á + Ã) + max





















^ ¿¡(¾2=2)^ ¿) v
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v(P=C;1) = maxf^ v(1) ; ¹ v(P=C;1)g :
B Hazard Rate of Menu Cost Model
In this appendix we described the details for the characterization of the hazard rate of price
adjustments of the menu cost model of Section 4.2. Section 2.8.C formula (8.24) of Karatzas
and Shreve (1991) displays the density of the distribution for the ¯rst time that a brownian
motion hit either of two barriers, starting from an arbitrary point inside the barriers. In our
case, the initial value is the price gap after adjustment, namely zero, and the barriers are
symmetric, given by ¡¹ p and ¹ p. We found more useful for the characterization of the hazard
rate to use a transformation of this density, obtained in Kolkiewicz (2002), section 3.3, as
the sum of expressions (15) and (16). In our case we set the initial condition x0 = 0 and the











8 (¹ p=¾)2 t
¶
: (A-1)





Notice that since equation (A-1) is a sum of exponentials evaluated at the product of ¡t
times a positive quantity, each of them larger. Thus, for large values of t the ¯rst term in
the sum dominates, and hence the expression for f(t) becomes
f(t) ¼
¼




8 (¹ p=¾)2 t
¶
for large t : (A-3)
and hence limt!1 h(t) = ¼2
8 (¹ p=¾)2 . Indeed, the shape of this hazard rate is independent of
¹ p=¾, this value only scales it up and down. Moreover, as Figure A-1 shows, the asymptote is
approximately attained well before the expected value of the time.
55Figure A-1: Hazard Rate of Menu Cost Model
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Note: B = 25;¾ = 0:1 and Ã = 0:04 .
56C Proofs
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. We let x¤ = ^ p=¼. Note that as ½ ! 0 we have:
½e¡½t

























































12 (1 ¡ e¡½¿)
+
½ ¿2


































From here we see that the optimal inaction interval ¿¤ is a function of 2 arguments, it is
increasing in the normalized cost ~ Á, and decreasing in the normalized drift (¼=¾)2. Keeping









which implies that ¿ is decreasing in ¾.
Note that for ¼ = 0 we obtain a square root formula on the cost Á and with elasticity






























since lim~ Á!0 ¿¤(~ Á) = 0, then one obtains the same expression than in the case of ¼ = 0, and




@~ Á = 1












then we let ¾2 ! 0 to get
Á
B = ¼2 ¿3
6 which implies a cubic root formula on the cost Á and















That @¿¤=@¼ = 0 evaluated at ¼ = 0 follows from totally di®erentiating
Á
B = ¼2 (¿¤)3
6 +¾2 (¿¤)2
2 .
Now consider the case when ½ > 0 and ¼ = 0 then ½V (¿) equals
½V (¿) =
½~ Á
1 ¡ e¡½¿ ¡
¿e¡½¿




The ¯rst order condition with respect to ¿ implies that the optimal choice satis¯es:
~ Á =
½¿¤ ¡ 1 + e¡½¿¤
½2 : (A-4)












The expression shows that if ½ = 0 we obtain a square root formula: ¿¤ =
q
2 ~ Á ; and that
the optimal ¿¤ is increasing in ½ provided ½ or ~ Á are small enough.
C.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
Proof. Di®erentiating the Bellman equation and evaluating it at zero we obtain:
½V
00(0) = 2B + ¾
2=2V
0000(0) (A-5)






Di®erentiating the quartic approximation equation (11), evaluating at ¹ p and imposing the


















































6 ¾2 ¹ p
4 ; (A-10)
thus solving for ¹ p we obtain the desired expression.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3.
Proof. We start with a simple preliminary result to set up the analysis showing that the
¯xed point of V coincides with the solution of the sequence problem. Denote by Vinfo;Á+Ã the
solution of the problem with observation cost only of Section 4.1, but where the observation
cost has been set to Á + Ã, and denote the optimal value of the time between observations
and price changes as ¿i. We interpret this as the value of following the feasible policy of
observing and adjusting (ÂTi = 1 all Ti) every ¿ periods, and hence V (~ p) · Vinfo;Á+Ã. Also
denote by Vmenu;Ã(¢) the solution of the problem with menu cost Ã and no observation cost
analyzed in Section 4.2. Since the observation cost is set to zero, this provides a lower bound
for the value function: V (~ p) ¸ Vmenu;Ã(~ p). Letting T the operator de¯ned by the right side
of equation (16), equation (17) and equation (18), and by TnV0 the outcome of n successive
applications of T to an initial function V0, we have that for each ~ p:
Vmenu;Ã(~ p) · T
nVmenu;Ã(~ p) · T
nVinfo;Á+Ã(~ p) · Vinfo;Á+Ã(~ p) ;
and the two sequence of functions converge pointwise. Since they converge to a ¯nite value,
their limit must be the same, by an adaptation of Theorem 4.14 in Stokey and Lucas (1989).
Thus:
V (~ p) = lim
n!1
T




pointwise. Furthermore, since Vinfo;Á+Ã(~ p) is a constant function, i.e. independent of ~ p, and
since Vmenu;Ã(~ p) > 0 for all ~ p, then we have that the value function V (~ p) is uniformly bounded.
We sketch the argument to show that the value function V is continuous on ~ p. Suppose
not, that there is jump down at ¹ p so that V (¹ p) > limp#¹ p V (¹ p). Then, ¯xed the policies that
correspond to a value of p > ¹ p in terms of stopping times and prices ^ p(¢) as de¯ned in the
sequence formulation of equation (14). Thus, the agent will observe, starting with ¹ p, after the
same cumulated value of the innovations on p¤, and it will adjust to the value Let ² = p¡¹ p the
di®erence between these two prices at time zero, and denote by fp(t)g;f¹ p(t)g the stochastic
process for the price that follow from the two initial prices. Notice that ¹ p(t) ¡ p(t) = ² for
all t > 0. By following that policy when the initial price is ¹ p, the expected discounted value
of ¯xed cost paid are exactly the same for the two initial prices. Thus, the di®erence of the











Since this di®erence is clearly continuous on ² and goes to zero as ² # 0, then the value
function is continuous.
Now we use the fact that V is bounded above uniformly and continuous to show that for
Á > 0, then the optimal policy for ¿(~ p), is uniformly bounded away from zero. Here is a
sketch of the argument. Suppose, as a way of contradiction, that for any ² > 0, we can ¯nd
a ~ p for which ¿(~ p²) < ². We will argue that for small enough ² it is cheaper to double ¿(~ p²).
The main idea is that this decreases the ¯xed by e¡½²Á, and increases the cost due to di®erent
information gathering in a quantity that is a continuous function of ². The reason why the
second part is continuous as function of ² is that the distribution of value of p¤(t + ²) and
p¤(t + 2²) have most of the mass concentrated in a neighborhood of p¤(t). The e®ect due to
the increase in cost due to evaluation of the period return objective function is small, since
it is the expected value of the integral of a bounded function between 0 and ² or between
0 and 2². Thus, for small ² this di®erence is small. The e®ect on the value function of the
mass p¤(t) is small, because the value function is uniformly bounded and this probability is
small, i.e. goest to zero as ² # 0. For the mass that is in the neighborhood of p¤(t), the e®ect
in the value function is small because the value function is continuous.
Using that inf ¿(~ p) ´ ¿ > 0, by Blackwell's su±cient conditions, we obtain that T is a
contraction of modulus exp(¡¿½) in the space of continuous and bounded functions.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. Under the conjecture that ^ p = 0 and that V (¢) is symmetric around zero, and by the
symmetry of the normal density, we can rewrite the Bellman equations (17) and (18) using
only the positive range for ~ p 2 [0 ; 1) as:38


























































We use the corollary of the contraction mapping theorem. First, notice that if the V in the
right side of equation (20) is symmetric around ~ p = 0, with a minimum at ~ p = 0, then it is
optimal to set ^ p = 0. Second, notice that if the function V in the right side of equation (19) is
symmetric with a minimum at ~ p = 0, then the value function in the left side of this equation
is also symmetric, and hence V in equation (21) is symmetric. Third, using the symmetry,
we show that if V (~ p) is weakly increasing, then the right side of equation (21) is weakly
38The second line in equation (A-11) uses that
R 1
¡1 V (p ¡ s)dN(s) =
R 1
¡p V (p + s)dN(s) +
R 1
p V (¡p +
s)dN(s).
60increasing. It su±ces to show that ¹ V (~ p) given by the right side of (A-11) is increasing in ~ p
for a ¯xed arbitrary value of ¿. We do this in two steps. The ¯rst step is to notice that the
expression containing ~ p2 in (A-11) is obviously increasing in ~ p. For the second step, without
loss of generality, we assume that V is di®erentiable almost everywhere and compute the
derivative with respect to ~ p of the remaining two terms involving the expectations of V (¢) in





















































































































> 0 for x > 0 and ~ p > 0. Notice that the inequality is
strict if ~ p > 0 and V 0(x) > 0 in a segment of strictly positive length. If ~ p = 0, then the slope
is zero.
Finally, di®erentiating the value function twice, and evaluating at ~ p = 0 we get
V
00(0) = 2 B


















^ ¿ 2 ¼
dz > 0 :
C.5 Proof of Proposition 5.
Proof. First we notice that using the quadratic approximation into the de¯nition of ¹ p given







Second we derive equation (23) as the ¯rst order condition for ^ ¿. To this end, use the
Bellman equation (20) for a ¯xed ^ ¿ > 0 evaluated at the optimal ^ p = 0, the symmetry of
V (~ p) , and the approximation
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(1 ¡ e¡½^ ¿)=½



























Maximizing the right side of this expression gives
0 = ¡
















































where we use n(¢) for the density of the standard normal. Using that V 00(0) = 2 Ã = ¹ p2, this
expression simpli¯es to
0 = ¡












rearranging and using the de¯nition of ^ ' gives ¾2^ ¿ = h(^ ') of equation (23).
Third, we obtain an expression for V 00(0). Di®erentiating the value function twice, and
evaluating it at ~ p = 0 we get
V
00(0) = 2 B


















^ ¿ 2 ¼
dz
62With a change in variable s = z=(¾
p
^ ¿) we have:
V
00(0) = 2 B






















Using the third order approximation V (~ p) = V (0) + 1
2V 00(0)(~ p)
2 around ~ p = 0 we obtain:
V
00(0) = 2 B





















2 B 1¡e¡½^ ¿
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and letting ½ # 0, using the de¯nition of ^ ' and N for the CDF of a standard normal:
V
00(0) =
2 B ^ ¿






Using equation (A-13) to replace V 00(0) into equation (A-14), using the de¯nition of ^ ', and
using ¾2^ ¿ = h(^ ') to replace ^ ¿ and
p
^ ¿ we obtain equation (22).
C.6 Numerical evaluation of Proposition 5.
In this section we evaluate the accuracy of the approximated solution in Proposition 5. To
do so, we solve the model numerically on a grid for ~ p and obtain the numerical counterparts
to the policy rule derived in Proposition 5. In doing so we approximate ¹ V (¢) through either
a cubic spline or a sixth order polynomial. Results are invariant to the latter.
As Figure A-2 - Figure A-4 show, the solution for ¹ p (and as a consequence for ^ ') in
Proposition 5 diverges from its numerical counterpart the more, the larger the ratio ® ´
Ã
Á
is. In particular, the approximated solution tend to understate the value of ¹ p relatively to
the numerical solution.
This discrepancy is due to the nature of our approximation which relies on a second
order approximation of ¹ V (¢), while higher orders (the fourth one in particular) become more
relevant as Ã=Á increases, causing the inaction range to widen. To document this e®ect, we
show the following computations. We solved the model numerically, assuming a polynomial
of order sixth for ¹ V (¢), on a grid of values for ~ p for values of ® = 0:1 and ® = 2. We used the
symmetry property of ¹ V (¢) to set the value of all the odd derivatives evaluated at ~ p = 0 equal
to zero. We then compared the numerical solution for ¹ V (¢) with the approximated one given
by Proposition 5, but having an intercept (i.e. ¹ V (0)) equal to the constant term in the sixth
order polynomial. As Figure A-5 shows, the quadratic approximation for ¹ V (¢) works better
for low values of ~ p, and more generally for low values of ®. The second order approximation
for ¹ V (¢) tends to overstate the value of the function for values away from zero, as it ignores the
fourth derivative V 0000(0), which is negative. While the di®erence in the approximation will
also a®ect the value of ^ V , we ¯nd this e®ect much smaller in our computations. Therefore,
63Figure A-2: Numerical and approximated ^ ' as a function of ® ´
Ã
Á














Note: parameter values are B = 20; ½ = 0:02; ¾ = 0:2;Ã = 0:03. We let Á to vary.
Figure A-3: Numerical and approximated ^ ¿ as a function of ® ´
Ã
Á















Note: parameter values are B = 20; ½ = 0:02; ¾ = 0:2;Ã = 0:03. We let Á to vary.
64Figure A-4: Numerical and approximated ¹ p as a function of ® ´
Ã
Á















Note: parameter values are B = 20; ½ = 0:02; ¾ = 0:2;Ã = 0:03. We let Á to vary.
the quadratic approximation tends to understate the inaction range, i.e. to produce values
of ¹ p that are smaller. This is consistent with the values displayed in Figure A-4.
Figure A-5: Numerical and approximated ¹ V as a function of ® ´
Ã
Á































Note: parameter values are B = 20; ½ = 0:02; ¾ = 0:2;Ã = 0:03. We let Á to vary.
65C.7 Proof of Proposition 6.
Proof. Begin de¯ning
^ f(^ ') =







^ h(^ ') = 2 (Á + 2Ã (1 ¡ N(^ '))) ;so that
^ f(^ ') =




B + 4¾2 Ã
B (1 ¡ N(^ '))
¤1=4 R ^ '
0 s2dN(s)
;
and noting that Ã = ^ f(') is the same as the solution of equation (22) and equation (23).
First we turn to the existence and uniqueness of the solution. We show that it follows
from an appliction of the intermediate function theorem, toghether with monotonicity. We
show that if
Á
Ã > 1=2 ¡ 2(1 ¡ N(1)) ¼ 0:1827 then: there is a value 0 < ^ '0 · 1 so that: i)
the function ^ f is continuous and increasing in ^ ' 2 [0; ^ '0), ii) ^ f(0) = 0, iii) ^ f(^ '0) > Ã, iv)
^ f(^ ') < 0 for ^ ' 2 (^ '0;1].









(1 ¡ N(^ '
0))




so that if ^ '0 < 1, the function ^ f as a discontinuity going from being positive and tending to
+1 to being negative and tending to ¡1.
The rest of the proof ¯lls in the details: Step (1): Show that ^ h(^ ')2 ¢ (^ ')2 is increasing in




0 s2dN(s) is increasing in ^ ' if
^ ' < 1. Step (3): Using (1) and (2) the function ^ f is increasing in ^ ' for values of ' that are
smaller than 1, provided that its denominator is positive.
Step (1) follows from totally di®erentiating h(^ ')2¢(^ ')2 with respect to ^ '. Collecting terms
we obtain that the derivative is proportional to Á + 2 ¢ Ã(1 ¡ N(^ ') ¡ ^ ' ¢ N0(^ ')). Since the
function 1¡N(^ ')¡ ^ '¢N0(^ ') is positive for small values of ^ ' and negative for large values, we
evaluate it at its upper bound for the relevant region, obtaining: Á+2Ã(1¡N(1)¡N0(1)) > 0
or Á > Ã2[N(1) + N0(1) ¡ 1] ¼ Ã 0:1667. But notice that this condition is implied by our
previous restriction Á > Ã[1=2 ¡ 2(1 ¡ N(1))] ¼ Á 0:1827.




0 s2dN(s) with respect to ^ '. Col-
lecting terms we obtain that the derivative is proportional to ^ '2¡
R ^ '
0 s2dN(s) Ã=2(Á+Ã (1¡
N(^ '))). This expression is greater than ^ '2 ¡
R ^ '
0 s2dN(s) =2((1 ¡ N(^ '))), which is obtained
by setting Á to zero. This integral is positive for the values of ^ ' in (0;1).
Now we turn to the comparative statics results. That ^ '¤ is decreasing in Á follows since ^ f
is increasing in Á. That ¾2^ ¿¤ is increasing it follows from the previous result and inspection of
h. That ^ '¤ is decreasing in ¾2=B follows since ^ f is increasing in ¾2=B. That ¾2^ ¿¤ is increasing
it follows from the previous result and inspection of h. That @ ^ '¤=@ ¾2
B = 0 at ¾2=B = 0 follows
from di®erentiating ^ f with respect to ¾2=B and verifying that that derivative is zero when
evaluated at at ¾2=B = 0. That ^ '¤ is strictly increasing in Ã when ¾2=B is small relative to
66Á it follows from di®erenting ^ f=Ã with respect to Ã. That derivative is strictly negative and
continuous on the parameters, when evaluated at Á > 0 and ¾2=B = 0.
C.8 Proof of Proposition 7.
Proof. We rewrite the solution of ¹ p and ^ ¿ using the solution of equation (24) into equation (22)
and equation (23). The approximation in equation (24) is based on the zero derivative found
in Proposition 6 in item 3. We now characterize the elasticity of ^ '0. First we write the
equation de¯ning ^ '0 as








where we let ~ ® = log® and ~ ' = log ^ '0. Di®erentiating ~ ' this expression with respect to ~ ®
















Since, ^ '0 ! 0 as ® ! 0, then
@ log ^ '0
@ log® ! 0. For values of ® > 0, we have that







(1 ¡ N(^ '0))
< 2; (A-18)
which is a property of the normal distribution for values of ^ '0 < 1. Finally, the ¯rst inequality
follows because 2 ^ '0=® = [1 ¡ ^ '2
04(1 ¡ N(^ '0))] < 1. The second inequality follows becasue
^ '0 < 1.
C.9 Proof of Proposition 8.
Proof. The expression is based on a second order expansion of ¿ around ~ p = 0. The ¯rst
order condition for ¿ can be written as:










































F¿ = 0 : That
@¿=@~ p = 0 follows from the symmetry of ¿(¢) around ~ p, which is veri¯ed directly by checking
that F~ p = 0 (see below). Totally di®erentiating F¿¿0 + F~ p we obtain:
0 = F¿¿(¿
0)
2 + F¿ ~ p¿
0 + F¿¿
00 + F~ p¿¿
0 + F~ p~ p ;












67To compute this second derivative we ¯rst compute:







































Taking ½ # 0, using that at the optimum F = 0, that in the approximation ¹ V 0(~ p) = V 00(0) ~ p
and that ¹ V 00(~ p) = V 00(0) we obtain:









































F~ p(¿; ~ p) = e
¡½¿
µ

















































Evaluating F~ p~ p at ~ p = 0 for ½ # 0 and the approximation with V 000(0) = 0 gives:
F~ p~ p(¿;0) = 2B : (A-20)
Expanding ¿(¢) around ~ p = 0, using that its ¯rst derivative is zero, and that the second deriva-
tive is the negative of the ratio of the expressions in equation (A-19) and equation (A-20) we
obtain:
¿ (~ p) = ¿ (0) + ¿

















which appears in the proposition.
C.10 Proof of Proposition 9.
Proof. We start by computing the second derivative of Ta(p) at p = 0 (for notation simplicity
we use p in the place of ~ p). To further simplify notation rename the extreme of integration
as:
s1 ´
























































¡ Ta(¹ p) n(s1)
@s1
@p
+ Ta(¡¹ p) n(s2)
@s2
@p
where n(s) denotes the density of the standard normal. The second order derivative is:
T
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^ ¿). Hence the second to last
line in the previous formula is ¡2T 0
a(¹ p) n(s1)
@s1
@p by the symmetry of Ta(p). Note moreover



























































Using that ¿00(0) = ¡2=¾2 (from Proposition 8), the last term in the previous equation can be
rewritten as ¡2
Ta(¹ p)
¾2^ ¿ (¡n0(^ ') ¡ ^ ' n(^ ')), which is zero since n0(x)+x n(x) = 0 for a standard
normal density.
Given that T 0
a(0) = T 000
a (0) = 0, and T 00
a (0) < 0, we approximate Ta(p) with a quadratic
69function on the interval [¡¹ p ; ¹ p] :







Using the ¯rst and the second derivative of this quadratic approximation into the right hand
side of equation (A-21), and ¿00(0) = ¡2=¾2, gives:
T
00
a (0) = ¡2=¾
2+T
00






2dN(s) ¡ 2 T
00






1 ¡ N(^ ') +
R ^ '
0 s2dN(s) + ^ 'n(^ ')
: (A-22)
To solve for Ta(0) let us evaluate Ta(p) at ¹ p obtaining:

















1 ¡ ^ '2 :
Using the quadratic approximation for Ta in the previous equation we get
















= ¿(¹ p) +
µ


















Replacing Ta(¹ p) = Ta(0) + 1
2T 00
a (0) ¹ p2 on the left hand side, and collecting terms gives
Ta(0) =











dN(s) ¡ ¹ p2
¶
1:5 ¡ N (2¹ ')
= ¿(¹ p)
1 + ¾2











1:5 ¡ N (2¹ ')
= ^ ¿
¡
1 ¡ ^ '
2¢ 1 + ¾2











1:5 ¡ N (2¹ ')
(A-23)
where the last line uses the equality ¿(¹ p) = ^ ¿¡
¡ ¹ p
¾
¢2 = ^ ¿ (1 ¡ ^ '2). Substituting equation (A-22)
into equation (A-23) gives
Ta(0) = ^ ¿
(1 ¡ ^ '2)





0 (¹ ' ¡ s)
2 dN(s) ¡ ¹ '2
´
1 ¡ N(^ ') +
R ^ '
0 s2dN(s) + ^ 'n(^ ')
1
A (A-24)
70which gives the approximation for the expression Ta(0) = ^ ¿ ¢ A(^ ') in the proposition. A
numerical study of the function A(^ ') shows that A(0) = 1, and that the function approx-
imation is accurate and increasing for ^ ' 2 (0;0:75), that A(0:75) » = 1:78 and decreasing
thereafter.
Next we show that, given equation (30), the average frequency of price adjustment can






























1 + ~ '2
p
1 + '2 ¡ ~ '
! p
1 + ~ '2
p
1 + '2d'; (A-26)
where the ¯rst equality follows from strict monotonicity of '(p). Then we can write Ta(0) =
~ T (0) = ^ ¿ ~ A(0; ^ ') ´ A(^ '), where
~ A(~ '; ^ ') =
1
1 + ~ '2 +
Z ¹ '
¡¹ '




1 + ~ '2
p
1 + '2 ¡ ~ '
! p
1 + ~ '2
p
1 + '2d': (A-27)
We use a grid of values for ~ ' to solve recursively for ~ A(~ '; ^ ').
C.11 Proof of Proposition 10.














2¿(p) > 0. Notice that
using p(') to denote the inverse function, we compute







which, abusing notation, de¯nes the new function
¿(') =
^ ¿
1 + '2 (A-28)




d' = q('(p))d' (A-29)








































































For clarity, rewrite the previous equation using the density of ~ p conditional on ':




























¿('), where the function ¿(') is given in equation (A-28).39 Using the de¯nition of ' and
the law of motion for ~ p it follows that ©(~ ';') ¡ ' is a random variable with the standard
normal distribution: n(©(~ ';') ¡ ').
By doing the change in variables from ~ p to ~ ' on the left-hand side of equation (A-30),







































We notice that q(¢) attains its maximum at ~ ' = 0, and that it is symmetric, so that





function can be approximated by a quadratic function with






The value of q(¢) and its ¯rst and second derivatives with respect to ~ ', evaluated at ~ ' = 0,














































































1 + '2 ;
d2©(0;')
(d~ ')2 = 0 ;
d3©(0;')
(d~ ')3 = ¡3
p
1 + '2:





























These two equations and the quadratic approximation for q(¢) give a system of 2 equations
















































































73Using these results into equation (34) to obtain

























































where we use the quadratic approximation of q(¢), the de¯nition of '(p), and the quadratic
approximation of ¿(p).
Notice that, given equation (30), the average frequency of price review can be always
written as nr = 1=Tr(0) where Tr(0) = ^ ¿R(^ '). This result follows directly from substituting
equation (30) into equation (A-32).
C.12 Proof of Proposition 11.
In this section we report the numerical solution of the model to the following experiments:
(i) a change in Ã holding Á ¯xed; (ii) a change in Á holding Ã ¯xed. These experiments are
meant to capture the elasticities of na and nr with respect to Ã and Á.
Figure A-6: Numerical and approximated ¹ p as a function of ® ´
Ã
Á



























































Note: ¯xed parameter values are ½ = 0:02; ¾ = 0:2; Ã = 0:03 when Á is allowed to change;
Á = 0:06 when Ã is allowed to change.
We show results for di®erent parameterizations of B = 5;20;50. The ¯rst row in
Figure A-6 display results for log(na);log(nr) to changes in log(Á) holding Ã = 0:03 as
74in our benchmark calibration. The larger Á, the closer the value of ® to zero. As we can see,
the elasticity of nr with respect to Á is roughly equal to - 1/2, independently of the level of
B and the level of ®. Similarly, the elasticity of na with respect to Á is not changing much
to changes in the level of B, however it is sensitive to the level of ®, being roughly equal to
- 1/2 for large values of Á, i.e. for ® closer to zero, and smaller at smaller values of Á.
The second row in Figure A-6 display results for log(na);log(nr) to changes in log(Ã)
holding Á = 0:06 as in our benchmark calibration. The smaller Ã, the closer the value of ®
to zero. The elasticities of na and nr with respect to Ã are smaller at smaller values of Ã.
C.13 Proof of Proposition 12.



































usign the change of variable ' = ~ p=(¾
p
¿(~ p)), using the approximation for the optimal
policty: ¿(p) = ^ ¿ ¡ (p=¾)2 = ^ ¿




1 + '2, and hence
this change of variables gives the density of the normalized prices: q(') = g(p('))dp(')=d'.







we de¯ne the density of the normalized price changes x as v(¢), satisfying v(x)=(¾
p
^ ¿) and
then the distribution of normalized price adjustment have density given by the change of
























+ n(x) for jxj > ¹ ' : (A-35)
Finally we can use the approximation for q(') ¼ q(0) + 1
2q00(0)'2 and the formulas for q(0)
and q(0)00 developed in the proof of Proposition 10. The expressions obtained there for q(0)
and q00(0) are a function of ¹ '. Thus we can write:





















+ n(x) for jxj > ¹ ' :
where we include ¹ ' as an argument to emphasize that this density does not depend on any
other parameter. This is the expression in the proof. Finally, we notice that the mode and
minimum are equal to ¹ '.
75C.14 Proof of Proposition 14.
Proof. Consider








where W(t) is a standard brownian motion. If ^ p and the ¹ T are optimal, then G(¢; ¹ T;¼) should
be maximized at ^ p. We will show that, provided that the stopping time is positive and ¯nite,
@G(0 ; ¹ T;¼)
@^ p
< 0 if ¼ > 0 : (A-38)
We write equation (A-37) as





(¼t ¡ ^ p)








































C.15 Proof of Proposition 15.
Proof. To show that
@^ p
@¼j¼=0 > 0 we note that ^ p = 0 for zero in°ation, and -by equation (47)
in Proposition 14- strictly positive for positive in°ation and strictly negative for negative
in°ation. To show that @^ ¿
@¼j¼=0 = 0 we let F(^ ¿; ^ p;¼) = 0 denote the ¯rst order condition of
the problem equation (17) with respect to ^ ¿:




























76Totally di®erentiating F(^ ¿(¼); ^ p(¼);¼) with respect to ¼, we can solve for @^ ¿=@¼ as function















We now show that @F(^ ¿;0;0)=@^ p = @F(^ ¿;0;0)=@¼ = 0 and @F(^ ¿;0;0)=@^ ¿ > 0, hence
@^ ¿=@¼ = 0. Direct computations give:
@F(^ ¿; ^ p;¼)
@¼






































and evaluating this expression at ¼ = ^ p = 0, using the symmetry of V (~ p) and of the normal
distribution N(s) around zero, we obtain that this derivative is zero. Likewise we obtain
that:
@F(^ ¿; ^ p;¼)
@^ p




























which evaluated at ¼ = ^ p = 0 also vanishes. Finally
@F(^ ¿; ^ p;¼)
@^ ¿















































which is strictly positive evaluated at ¼ = ^ p = 0 since V 00(0) > 0 and since V (~ p) and dN(s)
is symmetric around zero.
C.16 Proof of Proposition 16.
Proof. It is mathematically simpler to solve the menu cost model as concentrating in the
steady state case, i.e. when ½ = 0. This problem corresponds to the the limit as ½ # 0. Thus







B (¼t ¡ ^ p)













2 ¡ 2^ p¼t + ^ p
2¢

























































where we use that ¿¼
2 = argmin^ p
2^ p¿2
2 + ^ p2¿. The ¯rst order condition for ¿ gives









6 (Ã + Á)
B ¼2
¶1=3
; ^ p =
µ
3 ¼ (Ã + Á)
4 B
¶1=3
;and ^ p¡p = ¼¿ =
µ




The value of na is obtained as na = 1=¿¤: The values for ¿(~ p) are obtained by requiring
that the review happens exactly at the time of an adjustment: ¿(~ p)¼ = ~ p ¡ p in the range
of inaction. The optimal policy has this form because, due to the deterministic evolution of
~ p(t), if Á > 0 it is optimal to review only at the time of an adjustment.
Now consider the menu cost version of this model for ½ > 0, ¾ = 0 and ¼ > 0. We
use this model to show that for all ½ > 0, the optimal return point and boundaries satisfy
¹ p ¡ ^ p < ^ p ¡ p. In the range of inaction ~ p 2 (p; ¹ p) the value function satisfy the ODE:
½V (~ p) = B~ p
2 ¡ ¼V
0(~ p)
with value matching, optimality of ^ p and smooth pasting conditions:
V (p) = V (^ p) + Ã + Á; V
0(^ p) = 0 and V
0(p) = 0 :
The solution of the ODE in the range of inaction is:

















for some constant A to be determined. Let a0~ p+a1~ p+a2~ p2 be the particular solution of the
ODE. Its coe±cients must solve:
½
¡
a0 + a1~ p + a2~ p
2¢
= B~ p
















78Notice that the quadratic function showing the particular solution of the ODE is the value of
a policy where the ¯xed cost is never paid. Hence in the range of inaction, where the solution
to this ODE must hold, the value function has to be smaller. This implies that the constant A
has to be negative. We now use that A < 0 implies that ¹ p¡^ p < ^ p¡p. To see this, denote the
quadratic particular solution of the ODE as Q(~ p), so we have V 0(~ p) = Q0(~ p) ¡ A(½=¼)¡½=¼~ p.
This derivative is zero at ^ p where the function attains its minimum, and it is positive for



















































= Á + Ã
























¼(^ p¡¹ p) ¡ 1
´
= Á + Ã
We now obtain an expression for ¹ p as a function of ^ p and the parameters ¼(Á + Ã)=B by
letting ½ to go to zero. To do so, we use that ex ¡ 1 = x + (1=2)x2 + o(x2) and apply it to
e
½
¼(^ p¡¹ p) ¡ 1 obtaining:
¹ p































In this expression we can simplify the terms that are multiplied by 1=½. To see this we can
developed the third term into:
Á + Ã
B
½ = ¹ p































or canceling the terms multiplied by 1=½
Á + Ã
B
½ = ¹ p
2 ¡ ^ p













½ = ¹ p
2 ¡ ^ p
2 + ^ p 2 (^ p ¡ ¹ p) + ^ p
½
¼
(^ p ¡ ¹ p)





½ = ¹ p
2 ¡ ^ p
2 + 2^ p
2 ¡ 2^ p¹ p + ^ p
½
¼
(^ p ¡ ¹ p)
2 ¡ ^ p
2 ¡ ¹ p
2 + 2¹ p^ p + o(½)
canceling the common terms
Á + Ã
B
½ = ^ p
½
¼









and taking ½ to zero:
Á + Ã
B
¼ = ^ p (^ p ¡ ¹ p)
2
We can write ¹ p = a ^ p for a constant a > 1 to be determined:
Á + Ã
B
¼ = ^ p
3 (1 ¡ a)
2


























Now we compare ¹ p ¡ ^ p with ^ p ¡ p:
¹ p ¡ ^ p
^ p ¡ p
=
q
4
3
8
1
3
=
1
p
3
80